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 Abstract 
 
This thesis seeks to establish the wrongfulness of an unequal division of nurturing 
work between members of heterosexual couples. Nurturing work is the overlapping 
constellation of housework, care, and emotion work, each of which women do more 
of than their male partners. I turn to feminist political philosophy (specifically Susan 
Moller Okin) to show that justice requires, at minimum, that the vulnerability women 
experience as a result of marriage needs to be mitigated by the state, and that the 
equal distribution of nurturing work needs to be facilitated by labour law. However, 
this is not enough to establish whether or not one wrongs one’s partner by allowing 
her to do more nurturing work. In order to prove this, I rely on Ruth Sample’s work to 
show that an unequal division of labour constitutes degradation of women in three 
ways. Firstly, it constitutes taking advantage of an existing injustice by gaining the 
benefit of receiving more care than one gives because one’s female partner was 
socialised into giving it. Secondly, an inequality of nurturing work is also an 
inequality in status accord, and if such inequality is gendered, it confirms for oneself 
and one’s partner, as well as other witnesses, the relative lesser importance (and 
therefore inferiority) of women. This is also degradation. Thirdly, I argue, using 
Miranda Fricker and Sandra Bartky, that a gendered distribution of nurturing work 
contributes to the hermeneutical marginalisation of women, which also constitutes a 
degradation of women. I thus prove a strong moral obligation to refrain from 
degrading one’s partner, and therefore a strong moral obligation to not allow one to be 
taken care of more than one takes care of one’s partner. In the last chapter I show that 
nurturing work is significant for improving the quality of a relationship, as well as for 
contributing to one’s human flourishing. I argue this because even if the background 
conditions are not such that an unequal division of nurturing work would be 
degradation, there are very good reasons to become good at nurturing work, since it 
contributes to the flourishing of the individual as well as the relationship. 
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 Opsomming 
 
Hierdie tesis poog om te wys dat daar ‘n ongelyke verdeling van koesterende werk is 
tussen mense in heteroseksuele verhoudings en dat dié ongelyke verdeling onregmatig 
is.  Koesterende werk verwys na ‘n oorvleuelende konstellasie van huiswerk, sorg en 
emosie-werk.  Die tesis argumenteer dat vrouens meer van elkeen van dié werke doen 
as mans.  Ek steun op feministiese politieke filosofie (veral die van Susan Moller 
Okin) om te wys dat, in terme van basiese geregtigheid, die staat verplig is om die 
kwesbaarheid te versag wat vrouens ervaar as ‘n gevolg van die huwelik, en verder 
dat arbeidsreg die gelyke verdeling van koesterende werk moet bevorder.  Ek wys 
verder dat die reg onvoldoende is om te bevestig of jy jou gade skade aandoen deur 
haar toe te laat om meer koesterende werk as jy te doen.  Ek steun in dié verband op 
die werk van Ruth Sample, aangesien Sample aantoon dat vrouens op drie maniere 
onderdruk word deur die ongelyke verdeling van koesterende werk.  Eerstens, omdat 
vrouens gesosialiseer is om meer koesterende werk as mans te doen, is die ongelyke 
verdeling van koesterende werk die verdieping van ‘n bestaande ongeregtigheid.  Die 
ongelyke verdeling van koesterende werk kom tweedens neer op ‘n ongelyke 
verdeling van status.  Die ongelyke verdeling van koesterende werk bevestig as sulks 
dat vrouens minder belangrik (en dus minderwaardig) is as mans.  Dit is ook 
onderdrukking.  Ek argumenteer derdens, met verwysing na Miranda Fricker en 
Sandra Bartky, dat die ongelyke verdeling van koesterende werk bydra tot die 
hermeneutiese marginalisering van vrouens, en dat dit ook bydra tot die 
onderdrukking van vrouens oor die algemeen.  Ek ontbloot dus ‘n sterk morele plig 
om vrouens nie te onderdruk nie, en dan ook ‘n sterk morele plig om nie toe te laat dat 
mens meer gekoester word deur vrouens as wat mens vrouens koester nie.  In die 
finale hoofstuk dui ek aan dat koesterende werk ‘n wesenlike bydrae kan maak tot die 
kwaliteit van ‘n verhouding, en ook tot die kwaliteit van ‘n mens se lewe.  Dit is 
belangrik, want selfs as  die ongelyke verdeling van koesterende werk nie tot vrouens 
se onderdrukking gelei het nie, sou daar steeds baie goeie redes wees om goed te 
word in koesterende werk, aangesien dit bydra tot die ontwikkeling van die individu 
asook die verhouding. 	
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INTRODUCTION 	
I first became aware of the notion of emotion work on an Internet forum where 
women discussed the kinds of work they did in their romantic relationships that were 
not reciprocated.1’Emotion work is the work put in to elevate the status of others as 
well as to engender positive emotions and soothe negative emotions. These women 
were describing effort they put into their relationships that was exhausting, time-
consuming, essential to the functioning of a household and a partnership,  hardly ever 
noticed, and rarely reciprocated by their partners. This was revelatory to me because it 
exposed the functioning of relationships of those around me, as well as my own. I 
realised both that I was doing such unacknowledged work in certain relationships, and 
not acknowledging such work in other relationships. It was also clear that it was 
gendered. Not only do women do more housework than men (a fact of which many of 
us are aware), but they also do more emotion work.  
When I became aware of the unequal distribution of such nurturing work2, it 
was immediately clear to me that those of my relatives who are a generation older 
than I exhibited such a distribution of labour. This was not wholly surprising to me, 
since these family members of mine are not necessarily feminists. However, it soon 
became apparent to me that this was not a problem that had stopped with the previous 
generation – my female friends in their mid-twenties, who were in serious 
relationships with feminist men experienced a similar inequality in the division of 
labour in their relationships. It was strange to me that men and women who did not 
believe in gender roles or in relevant innate differences in abilities between men and 
women still so clearly exhibited a gendered division of labour. It seemed obviously 
unfair to me that one partner could do most of the ‘taking care of’, and that the other 
partner received most of the benefit of being ‘taken care of’, and I wanted to 
determine philosophically why it was wrong. 
Some months before writing this, I met a couple that caused me to refine my 
question. The couple was in a 24/7 master-slave relationship, with the male partner in 																																																																				
1 This weblog can be found at 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B0UUYL6kaNeBTDBRbkJkeUtabEk/view?pref=2&pli=1 
 
2 This is a term I will unpack at length in Chapter 1, but briefly, it is a constellation of three 
overlapping kinds of work: housework, care, and nurturing work.		
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the master role and the female partner in the slave role. Let’s call them Tom and 
Emma. Before meeting them, I naturally assumed that the balance of power would be 
in Tom’s favour, and that the relationship would be exploitative of Emma in some 
way. However, as soon as I met Emma, I knew it wasn’t the case. She was a 
vivacious, extraverted, and vibrant woman wearing bright red lipstick and a tight 
dress. Tom, on the other hand, was a poorly dressed, balding twenty-five-year-old 
who was shy and bland. He preferred to listen to Emma speak rather than speaking 
himself, even as Emma requested that we ignore her and speak only to him. 
 She told us the rules that dictated her relationship, and these included putting 
her master in charge of what she ate (she was only allowed sugar on Fridays) and the 
household budget (she handed over her paycheck to him as soon as she got it). He was 
not to leave her alone in the flat because she needed company at all times. 
Interestingly, this couple was polyamorous, so even though Tom putatively had this 
great power over Emma, he did not even assert the power that many men (and 
women) do in romantic relationships to prevent her from having sexual relationships 
with other people. 
Of course, there were some sexual elements to the rules of their relationship, 
but most of the rules seemed to be about Emma handing over the responsibility for 
taking care of herself to Tom – in other words, she was using their master/slave 
structure as a way of extracting extra care from her male partner that she would not 
usually get. I learned later from acquaintances that she had attempted this in previous 
relationships, but Tom was the first who acquiesced to the relationship structure, and 
that she had sought it out because she suffers from depression and wanted an escape 
from the responsibility of caring for herself at times. 
This was the first couple I had met where the distribution of nurturing work 
was skewed the other way, where the male partner was doing much more of this type 
of work than the female partner. In the cases of my friends and their feminist partners, 
their unequal distribution of labour seemed obviously wrong, but with this couple it 
was not clear to me that it was wrong for Tom to be doing more work than Emma. For 
this reason, I will use this thesis to determine whether an unequal division of 
nurturing work is wrong as such, or if it is wrong because it is an instance of 
patriarchal power over women. In the process of writing, I have vacillated between 
these two positions, but this thesis will conclude that whereas the wrongfulness of an 
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unequal division of labour because of gender is clear, it is less clear whether it is 
wrong as such.  
This thesis is structured as follows: in the first chapter I explicate the 
necessary conceptual and empirical groundwork for the theoretical work that follows 
in later chapters. I provide a definition of nurturing work, which is a term I have 
coined to refer to three overlapping kinds of work, namely, housework, emotion 
work, and care. I also provide an overview of sociological data which proves that the 
division of nurturing work is gendered, and so show that women on average do more 
emotion work, more housework, and more care work than their male partners. The 
purpose of this is to emphasise the relevance and indeed urgency of this philosophical 
work. 
The rest of the thesis attempts to establish whether an unequal distribution of 
nurturing work is wrongful, either because it is gendered, or wrong as such. My 
strategy in answering this question has been to test my intuitive responses as to why it 
is wrong: because it is unjust, because it is exploitative, and because nurturing work is 
the kind of work that ought to be reciprocated. 
The second chapter tests the intuition that the unequal distribution of nurturing 
work is unjust by turning to liberal feminism. I look at two feminist liberals who both 
use the liberal device of the contract in order to determine how justice applies to 
intimate relationships, and thereby I determine if the wrongfulness of a gendered 
distribution of labour is rooted in its unjustness. The first feminist theorist I look at is 
Jean Hampton, who uses a ‘contractarian test’ to determine if the requirements of 
justice are met by one’s intimate relationship. I then turn to Susan Moller Okin, who 
uses the social contract to prove the existence of certain gendered injustice in the 
institution of the family, particularly in the division of labour. I conclude that 
Hampton’s contractarian test is not suited to test the fairness of the division of 
nurturing work, but that Okin’s political philosophy shows that there is an obligation 
on behalf of the state to facilitate a more equal division of nurturing work via labour 
law, as well as to mitigate the vulnerability of women caused by marriage. However, 
political philosophy is ill-suited to determine the wrongfulness of a division of 
nurturing work in an interpersonal relationship. 
For this reason, in Chapter Three, I look at whether or not such unequal 
division of labour can be considered exploitative, which would establish the 
wrongfulness on the interpersonal level of the relationship. To this end, I utilise 
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thinkers in materialist feminism and their analyses of the modes of production in the 
home, and how Marx’s theory of exploitation can be extended to intimate 
relationships. Next, I look at alternative accounts of exploitation to determine if, 
firstly, the unequal distribution of labour in couples counts as exploitation under these 
accounts, and if they can successfully explain its wrongfulness. In doing so, I show 
how the unequal division of nurturing work contributes to the oppression of women 
by contributing to their hermeneutical marginalisation. I conclude in this chapter that 
the gendered division of nurturing work is wrong because it constitutes exploitation as 
well as  degradation, and contributes to the oppression of women. 
The fourth chapter turns to the particular nature of nurturing work in order to 
determine if there is something about it that means that, firstly, it is non-distributable, 
and secondly, that it is a moral activity. Using the ethics of care, I explore whether its 
nature as a moral activity imposes particular moral obligations to provide such work 
for people with whom one is intimate. I will show how insights from the ethics of care 
can at best impose a weak obligation to do nurturing work for one’s partner, but that 
being good at nurturing is important for the flourishing of the individual and of the 
relationship.  
There may well be other grounds for arguing for a strong obligation to provide 
nurturing work for one’s intimates, or at least to reciprocate such work when one is 
able to do so. The purpose of this paper is to test what seemed to be the most 
promising existing feminist philosophy to justify such an obligation, and doing so has 
yielded a strong moral obligation to refrain from distributing nurturing work in a way 
that is gendered because it is exploitative and contributes to the oppression of women, 
and a weak general moral obligation to provide nurturing work for one’s partner. 
Having covered these existing fields of feminist philosophy, I contend that this paper 
allows for further work that could enrich our understanding of our moral obligations 
to provide nurturing work for our intimates.  
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CHAPTER ONE: GROUNDWORK 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
  
The aim of this chapter is to lay down the necessary empirical groundwork for the 
theoretical and normative work that follows in the subsequent chapters. This will 
entail explaining some of the key terms I will be relying on, specifically nurturing 
work, which is a term I have coined to refer to an interlinked constellation of emotion 
work, housework, and care, each of which will be explained. This chapter aims to 
show that it is still the status quo that in monogamous heterosexual relationships, 
female partners do far more nurturing work than their male partners. In order to show 
this, I will be relying on sociological studies from the last two decades done on the 
kinds of work, and their relative quantities, done by partners in heterosexual 
relationships. These studies will cover each of the elements of nurturing work, and 
show that one’s gender is the greatest predictor of how much nurturing work one 
does, rather than relative income, relative time constraints, and other factors that it 
could be ascribed to.  
The scope of this thesis is limited to cohabitating heterosexual couples, 
married or unmarried. This is possible since, though cohabiting couples sometimes 
have more egalitarian ideologies than married couples, their distribution of labour 
remains equally traditional (Miller and Sassler, 2016:696). This chapter will explore 
the inequality of the distribution of different kinds of work, including housework 
(including, but not limited to, cleaning, laundry, cooking, shopping, and repairs), 
childcare, and nurturing work. I use the words ‘wife’, ‘husband’, and ‘partner’ at 
various points in this paper, but I intend them to refer to the same thing: cohabiting 
long-term heterosexual partners who are not necessarily married. The words ‘wife’ 
and ‘husband’ usually refer to married people, but since unmarried couples adopt 
similar gender roles as married couples, these words need not be exclusively attached 
to marriage for the purpose of this paper. 
In limiting the scope of my thesis as such, I have excluded a number of other 
kinds of romantic relationships, including same-sex couples and multiple-partner 
polyamorous couples. The reason for excluding same-sex couples is that the unequal 
distribution of housework and nurturing work interestingly simply does not apply to 
same-sex couples (Kurdek, 2005:252), which supports the angle that this paper is 
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taking: this is a gendered issue, and is a case of gendered injustice. Further, there 
simply is not sufficient research about polyamorous multiple-partner relationships to 
use as a comparison. The findings about heterosexual, monogamous couples can 
therefore not be extrapolated to these other types of long-term relationships.  
 
1.1. DEFINING NURTURING WORK 
 
I have coined this term to refer collectively to three kinds of work performed in 
couples that share a household. The three kinds of work are housework, care, and 
emotion work, and I am treating them collectively rather than separately because of 
the ways in which they overlap and are intertwined with each other. I will explain 
each kind of work below, and explain where the overlaps reside, starting with the 
most complex: emotion work.   
1.1.1. EMOTION WORK 
 
Emotion work is a term first used by Arlie Hochschild, a sociologist, who used it to 
refer to the management of emotions by the self, and also the work that is done to 
engender and manage emotions in others. This is a completely different way of 
thinking about how emotions operate: we typically think of them as spontaneous and 
largely outside of our control. However, Hochschild argues that emotions are often 
not spontaneous at all, but are rather subject to ‘feeling rules’, with greater or lesser 
success (1979:564). This is exemplified by someone “trying to like” someone, or 
“trying not to feel sad”, or attempting to get into an appropriate mood for a party. We 
are also reminded of these rules when we tell ourselves or others, “You have no right 
to be jealous”, or “Your anger is irrational” (Hochschild, 1979:564). Such expressions 
indicate that we recognise feeling rules and attempt to adjust our emotions 
accordingly. We do this in social interactions with others and even privately. These 
are all kinds of emotion work we do on ourselves. 
A further component of emotion work is the work done on other people, 
which is what is of primary interest for this thesis. These are the ‘activities that are 
concerned with the enhancement of others’ emotional well-being and with the 
provision of emotional support’ (Erickson, 2005:338). Also known as ‘interpersonal 
emotion management’, it is an activity that requires time, effort, and skill (Erickson, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 7	
2005:338). This includes comforting, encouraging, showing interest, affirming, 
showing affection, and empathising. This is not entirely distinct from work done on 
the self: emotion work done on the self is a form of ‘deep acting’, which means that it 
is not simply a matter of displaying the correct emotion (such as smiling), but actually 
feeling the correct emotions (Hochschild, 1979:569). Empathising would, for 
example, involve actually aligning one’s actual emotions with the struggles of others, 
rather than only expressing the appropriate words and gestures.  
For Hochschild, emotion work is politicised rather than neutral, and tied up 
with the distribution of power in four ways: firstly, it is gendered, where women are 
expected to take up more of the kind of emotion work that engenders positive 
emotions and elevated status (which Hochschild refers to as ‘caring’) (2003b:163). 
According to a study by Erickson, women are held accountable for emotion work 
(both towards their own and others’ emotions) in a way men are not (2005:339). 
Secondly, women learn how to use emotion work to compensate for the fact that they 
have fewer material resources, where they offer their emotion work as a gift in 
exchange for material resources (Hochschild, 2003b:163). Thirdly, women are 
vulnerable to the displacement of other people’s emotions, where they are forced to 
be the recipient of complaint, or anger, or neediness, whereas men experience a 
‘status shield’ that protects them from the negative emotions of others (Hochschild, 
2003b:181). Finally, the power differential between men and women means that the 
nurturing work that women do is far more likely to be invisible than when men do the 
same work. 
A characteristic of emotion work is that it must appear effortless in order to 
retain its value. Emotion work that comes across as effortful seems insincere. It must 
appear to emanate spontaneously from within in order to be effective – for example, 
as ‘reflections of interpersonal relationships or love’ (Erickson, 2005:349). Put 
differently, the receiver of emotion work wants to experience the interest shown as 
flowing from a sincere and deeply felt solidarity between the parties. There is some 
evidence that men do see it as such – they see emotion work as a feature of 
interpersonal expression that is not instrumental. However, women are far more likely 
to conceptualise emotion work as work, probably because they are held accountable 
for its performance in ways that men are not (Erickson, 2005:339). Further, women 
do significantly more emotion work than men do, perhaps because it is seen as ‘work’ 
– in other words, not contingent on leisure, inclination or convenience. Some see the 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 8	
labeling of this activity as ‘work’ as degrading the activity (probably because work is 
seen as something one is compelled to do, not necessarily something that one wants to 
do), but the more satisfied two people in a relationship, are the more likely it is that 
they are doing a great deal of this emotion work (Erickson, 2005:338). As Erickson 
argues, emotional support should be reconceptualised as work: it ‘does not emanate 
from within, but must be managed, focused and directed so as to have the intended 
effect on the recipient’ (Erickson, 2005:349). It takes time, effort, and skill.  
Hochschild distinguishes between ‘emotion work’ and ‘emotional labour’, 
where the former takes place in personal relationships, and the latter is commodified, 
particularly in the service industry. Her work on the commodification of emotional 
labour will be discussed in detail in the third chapter of this thesis, where this very 
distinction will be challenged. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I will entirely exclude the kinds of emotion 
work that are intended to engender negative feelings or status deflation (such as 
inducing guilt as a form of punishment in a child). Rather, when I use the term 
‘emotion work’ in this thesis, it has the following characteristics (as summarised from 
above): 1) it is targeted at the interlocutor’s emotions, specifically to induce a positive 
emotion, 2) it is done with an attitude of willingness; and 3) it must be effective in 
bringing about those emotions, or at least, its effectiveness must of be of concern to 
the one doing emotion work. The positive emotions that can be induced include 
feeling cared for, listened to, appreciated, loved, or comforted, amongst other 
emotions. The one doing the emotion work must also manage her own emotions so 
that she feels the appropriate feelings when doing the work: she must, for example, 
suppress impatience, distraction, and resentment, and cultivate concentrated attention, 
affection, and willingness. Finally, it is not enough to intend to produce a certain 
result, she must actually do so. This final element I have borrowed from the ethics of 
care, which sees care as relational, which means that it must be effective (Tronto, 
1993:108). This means that it cannot be the ‘thought that counts’ – it actually has to 
bring about the desired emotion. It also means that the one doing the emotion work 
must be receptive to how her work is received, and must alter her strategy to make it 
more effective if necessary. 
Note that I have not specified what kinds of activities constitute emotion work. 
Some unambiguous examples would include the following: noticing someone is out 
of sorts, asking them what is wrong, helping them determine the cause of their 
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negative emotion, and doing work to eradicate the negative emotion. For example, 
drawing someone out about their frustration about their boss, which would entail 
being indignant with one’s partner about their boss. Another example might be 
boosting someone’s ego if they have lost a job or received criticism, so that one 
elevates the other’s status to counteract the status deflation that occurred as a result of 
that event, through, for example, shared indignation, and expressing one’s own 
indignation on behalf of the other, in one’s own words. However, any kind of activity, 
if done in such a way that has those three characteristics mentioned above could 
constitute emotion work. I will point out later how this means that emotion work can 
overlap with other kinds of nurturing work.  
1.1.2. CARE 
 
I have decided to treat care as somewhat distinct from emotion work, since care is 
often associated with the needy body. Emotion work can certainly be expected to 
enhance one’s life, but it need not be linked to needs. I am thus using care to refer to 
ways in which one takes responsibility for someone else’s bodily needs. This would 
certainly include taking care of someone when they are ill, such as administering to 
them in their sick bed, or by going out to buy medication they may need. It may also 
involve taking extra responsibility for a partner if they suffer from mental illness and 
are sometimes less able to take responsibility for themselves. Caring is thus also 
especially relevant when the body is more needy than usual, for example, with the 
very young, the very old, the sick and the vulnerable. It would also include taking 
responsibility for maintenance of someone else’s health, by, for example, ensuring 
that they take their chronic medication, or eat healthily, or exercise. I will show in 
detail how this particular activity of taking responsibility for another’s health is 
gendered in section 1.2.3. 
Caring can overlap with emotion work, but need not necessarily. For instance, 
a caregiver may lay her hand on her partner’s fevered brow both as a gesture of 
sympathy and to assess the kind of caregiving she needs to do. If caring for an ill 
partner is offered as a gift, as an intentional way to relieve the other’s burden, and if it 
were received as such, then it would also be emotion work. However, it is trite to say 
that this kind of caring work often does not engender positive emotions and rather 
provokes irritation – the response to a remonstration to not have a second helping of 
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red meat or to add salt, or have another whiskey, is probably never a warm feeling of 
gratitude expressed by a loving ‘thank you’. The purpose of this kind of remonstration 
is also clearly not to engender a positive emotion, but rather to ensure the health and 
longevity of one’s partner.  
1.1.3. HOUSEWORK 
 
Housework is arguably the most time-consuming of all the kinds of work, but it is 
also distinct in that it need not be other-centered. Rather than being work that one 
does explicitly for one’s partner and for the sake of the relationship, housework is a 
collection of tasks and activities that need to be done, and can be divided up between 
partners. I define housework as any work that goes into creating, maintaining, and 
improving the home (as opposed to the house). It is about the cultivation of a certain 
kind of dwelling-space, and involves the often very practical work that makes it 
possible. This would, of course, include cleaning, laundry, repairs, gardening, making 
a space more beautiful, and maintenance of the building, such as repainting the walls. 
It involves the mental work of taking stock of what needs to be done, and anticipating 
needs such as making sure a person has the clothes they need for work washed and 
ironed, and making sure cleaning supplies are in stock. 
Cooking is an interesting and complicated activity that at least resides 
somewhere in between housework and caring, and can overlap with emotion work as 
well. It can be done as a form of caring – for example, if one’s partner has particular 
dietary requirements that one accommodates in one’s cooking for them, such as 
weighing out portions or cooking very healthy food. Taking account of others’ 
physical needs also takes place in the shopping one does for the household and 
catering to preferences in doing so. Cooking is also interesting because it is one of the 
largest tasks that needs to be done for household, since it occurs once or more times a 
day and can be time-consuming. However, it is also one of the more enjoyable 
household activities, and for that reason is sometimes more equally distributed than 
less pleasant tasks like cleaning. Cooking can also constitute emotion work if one 
cooks one’s partner’s favourite meal in express appreciation for something they did, 
or to make them feel special. 
Housework can constitute emotion work when it is offered as a gift. For 
example, in the event that housework is evenly distributed between partners, and one 
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partner takes on some of the other’s responsibilities because that partner is 
particularly stressed or depressed, then it is done in part to engender positive emotions 
for one’s partner. An example might be where if the female partner has the task of 
driving her children around after school, but has a particularly stressful week in her 
job, then her male partner taking over that task for the week is both a practical 
decision as well as an instance of emotion work targeted at her making feel cared for 
and the importance of her work acknowledged.  
The various kinds of nurturing work therefore sometimes fall into only one of 
these categories, but often overlap, and the intention and effect of the activity can 
mean that all three categories overlap. I will now present empirical data to show how 
each of these categories, and therefore nurturing work as a whole, is a gendered 
activity.  
 
1.2. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF GENDERED DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR  
1.2.1. HOUSEWORK  
 
The easiest distribution of labour to measure is that of housework, and as such there is 
the most data on this subject. The most effective kind of study to measure housework 
is a time-diary study, where each partner has to account for every hour of their day, 
since both men and women over-report how much housework they do. One might 
expect that the distribution of household labour is vastly unequal between working 
men and their stay-at-home wives, but research also shows that there is a vast 
discrepancy in hours spent on unpaid work between partners who both work full-time. 
When a couple lists their responsibilities of household labour, their lists usually have 
a more or less equal number of items (Kimmel, 2000:128). However, the items on the 
male partner’s list are usually tasks that occur once a week or once every few weeks – 
for example, cleaning the pool, mowing the lawn, changing the oil in the car, or 
repairing broken appliances. In contrast, the items on the female partner’s list are 
usually daily activities, such as cooking, shopping, and cleaning. Cooking involves 
one to three meals a day, cleaning occurs every day and shopping often occurs 
multiple times a week. That means that, despite the number of items being equivalent, 
the number of hours that go into the respective lists differ vastly. 
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Men often frame their role in the household as “helping out” or “pitching in” – 
this implies that the work is actually the woman’s work that a man can occasionally 
assist in alleviating, instead of seeing it as equally his responsibility (Kimmel, 
200:128). This “helping out” or “pitching in” often occurs upon prompts or 
instructions, but this work of delegating household labour is also just that – work. 
Household labour often involves anticipating needs: replacing the toilet roll for the 
next person to use the bathroom, buying milk before the next person’s cup of coffee, 
noticing that there are items in the fridge that have gone off and need to be thrown 
away. If all the household work that a man does is delegated to him, then the work of 
noticing these needs still falls to the female partner, and this further enforces the idea 
that household work is a woman’s domain that is her responsibility to ensure it is 
done, whether it is by doing it herself or by delegating it, or asking for assistance. 
In dual-earner couples, women do vastly more housework than men do. For 
example, an Australian study revealed that male partners do on average 11 hours per 
week of housework whereas their female partners do about 23 (Bittman, 2003: 186). 
In an American study, men did 5 hours for every 20 hours that women did (Kimmel, 
2000:128). That this division is due to gender is one hypothesis out of many. Other 
possible explanations for this division of work include the relative income of spouses, 
their relative time constraints, their particular gender ideologies, and the way that 
each partner constructs their own gender (Erickson 2005).  
The first is, perhaps, the most intuitive: the idea that division of household 
labour is determined by relative resources of the couple, rather than their gender per 
se. The idea is that whoever earns more money can “buy out” their portion of 
household labour (Erickson, 2005:339). However, this does not receive empirical 
support (Erickson, 2005:346; Bittman et al, 2003:209). There is some evidence that 
women do less housework as their pay increases, however, men’s contribution to 
household labour is not at all affected by their wives’ income up until the point of 
equality in income between the couple. This suggests that either more housework is 
outsourced, or if that is unaffordable, the housework simply does not get done. 
Hochschild found exactly this phenomenon in dual-earning couples (1979:205). 
Interestingly, at the point where the wife’s income begins to exceed her husband’s 
income, the husband does less housework (Bittman et al, 2003:207), and the wife 
does more.  
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Several sociologists theorise that this phenomenon can be explained by 
“power-balancing” (see Hochschild 2003a, Tichenor 2005 and Bittman et al. 2003). 
This is when the male partner compensates for his perceived loss of power due to 
earning less by doing less housework. Ensuring that the second shift remains his 
partner’s problem is thus a strategy to preserve dominance and relative status.  This 
same strategy is followed by women: women who earn more than their husbands want 
to ensure that the second shift remains their own problem – they also engage in 
‘balancing’ to preserve the structure of male domination in their relationship 
(Hochschild, 2003a:231). The gendered economy of gratitude confirms this: women 
who earn more than their husbands tend to be grateful, firstly, that they are able to 
contribute so much to the household coffers, and secondly, that their husbands allow 
them to do so (Hochschild, 2003a:212; 254). Men in those situations do not show 
gratitude for the greater income of their wives, nor for the extra work that their wives 
put into the second shift. Veronica Tichenor further found that higher-earning women 
are just as likely, or more likely, to defer to their husbands’ decision-making in order 
to preserve the gendered power differential (2005:192).  
The way in which men and women conceive of their earnings is also 
importantly different. Even when both partners earn more or less the same amount, 
they are likely to think of the male partner’s income as “essential” and the female 
partner’s as supplementary (Thebaud, 2010:334). Even in couples where the female 
partner earns more, the male partner’s work is considered more important, which is 
another reason that women do more housework in such situations (Thebaud, 
2010:334, Tichenor 2005:193). This also contributes to women opting to reduce their 
work to part-time, or to stop working altogether, thus removing them from the dual-
earner bracket, but this is a symptom of the same issues that characterise dual-earning 
couples. 
A further hypothesis is that of gender construction: if one conceives of oneself 
in masculine terms, one will do less household work as well as emotional labour, and 
if one conceives of oneself in feminine terms one will do more household work and 
emotional labour (Erickson, 2005:340). This is somewhat true for men – those who 
conceive of themselves in more feminine terms do perform somewhat more nurturing 
work (Erickson, 2005:345). However, this is not true of women – even those who 
conceive of themselves in more masculine terms are likely to do more caring work 
(345). Because they conceive of it in agentive and instrumental terms, it seems that 
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housework is not merely an expression of identity or love for women, but rather, work 
– and women are held accountable to do it in a way that men are not (348). Men, on 
the other hand, do not conceive of emotion work in agentive terms but rather only as a 
part of interpersonal relationships – rather than seeing it as deliberate and considered 
work that they do, they see it as arising naturally and spontaneously from their 
feelings of affection or love. When something is seen neither as work nor even as 
deliberate, it is not seen as something that has to be done even if one does not feel like 
it, but rather as only done when one has the urge or it is convenient to do so.   
An alternative hypothesis is that of time constraints: whoever works fewer 
hours of paid work will work more hours of unpaid work. This, however, does not 
receive empirical support (Erickson, 2005:346). Yet another competing hypothesis is 
that of gender ideology – where a more traditional gender ideology will result in 
female partners doing comparatively more household work and male partners doing 
less than their respective egalitarian counterparts. However, there is only a significant 
correlation for men: a man holding a more traditional gender ideology will result in 
his wife doing more work and him doing less, but egalitarian and traditional women 
do the same amount of work (348).  
This all hints at the fact that the distribution of labour is not explicable in 
terms of the members of the couple having found a way of sharing that suits both of 
their lifestyles, their incomes, their ideologies, and the way that they would like to 
express their gender. Even when the effects of these other variables are accounted for, 
being female is still the primary predictor of doing more of the second shift (and all 
the kinds of work it entails). This may suggest to some that the difference is innate, 
but I will refute that notion using psychological studies later in this chapter. The sheer 
difference in hours spent on unpaid work between men and women will be argued in 
Chapter Three to be unjust due to exploitation. 
 
1.2.2. EMOTION WORK  
 
The division of what I have called emotion work is also gendered. Women do more 
emotion work than men do (Erickson, 2005:344). One of the characteristics I 
attributed to emotion work is that it must be received as such. However, there is a 
perception that women appreciate emotion work done for them, or others close to 
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them more, or have more need of it. It may be true that women appreciate emotion 
work more, given that the economy of gratitude is premised on what people feel they 
can either legitimately or realistically expect from their partner. Nevertheless, it seems 
plausible to hypothesise that men and women have different expectations or 
experiences of emotion work - perhaps that women value it more, or that their 
experience of it is more positive. However, a recent study (Curran, McDaniel, 
Totenhagen and Pollitt, 2005) showed that for both partners, an increase in emotion 
work by their partner improved feelings of commitment to and satisfaction with the 
relationship. (Curran et al, 2015:169). There are some slight differences in the kinds 
of positive emotions engendered by being the recipient of emotion work by men and 
women, but this marked increase in relationship satisfaction is enough to show that 
emotion work in romantic relationships is important to both men and women. 
There is therefore already a hint that in order to maximise satisfaction with a 
relationship, a more equal division of emotion work is required. Positive marital 
outcomes are associated with equal emotion work (Curran et al. 2015:159), not with 
an overall level of emotion work. Further, men’s provision of emotion work 
‘improved both their own and their wives’ marital outcomes’ (Curran et al, 
2015:159). For this reason, there is no way to receive all the benefits of emotion work 
for a relationship or marriage without contributing to it equally.  
There is also a way in which men benefit from women’s emotion work for 
others indirectly. In my definition of emotion work above, I limited it to emotion 
work done for one’s partner. However, women also do more emotion work for people 
outside of their romantic relationships, and this benefits their male partners indirectly, 
so it is worth looking at here. The relevant social relationships include extended 
family, the community, and the friends of the couple. Examples of the effort involved 
include remembering birthdays and making a phone call, sending a birthday card, or 
sending a gift. It might also include cooking for someone (perhaps a neighbour) who 
is ill, or taking them flowers. It also entails making an effort to organise social events 
or family gatherings for the purpose of sustaining relationships. If the couple has 
children, this will also involve the children’s playdates and birthday parties, parents’ 
meetings and school events, and the birthdays of the children. These kinds of 
activities are, of course, not the entire stuff of relationships, but rather a deliberate 
demonstration of care, a way of enacting the value that a person has for the couple, 
the child, the family, or the individual.  
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It may be useful to argue that this can, in fact, be considered work.  These 
interactions require effort, bookkeeping, planning, and attention. Especially in the 
case of the community and extended family, there may be other values in maintaining 
the relationships other than simply mutually enjoying spending time together, which 
means that often these interactions are perceived as effortful more often than 
friendships. However, even in the case of friendship, not every social interaction will 
be the product of natural enthusiasm. It seems to be more intuitive to women that 
friendship means putting in effort even when it is not convenient or even desired for 
its own sake – for example, attending birthday parties or weddings even at personal 
cost. Men, on the other hand, seem to be more loath to consider this work (and thus an 
obligation), because it seems to degrade the activity. This once again suggests that 
women are held accountable to this kind of work more than men are. If men do not 
see this as work, it is likely to be seen as non-obligatory, and to only take place when 
it is convenient and when the whim arises. 
I have not acquired data about the actual effort expended by male and female 
partners on people outside the partnership, but the evidence of this can be seen 
indirectly in the isolation of widowers. Widowers are left without a social network in 
a way that widows are not, which suggests that these widowers depended on their 
wives to maintain social connections. In a paper by Berardo (1970), aged widowers 
were ‘less likely to 1) be living with children, 2) to have a high degree of kin 
interaction, 3) to receive from or give to children various forms of assistance, 4) to 
have friends in or outside the community or to be satisfied with their opportunities to 
be with close friends’ (14). A further disturbing finding was that in the case of a 
surviving father rather than mother, the ‘frequency of interaction with extended 
family members was nearly as low as when both parents were deceased’ (Berardo, 
1970:15). Further, the ‘loss of a spouse had a more adverse effect on the social 
participation of widowers than on that of widows’ (Berardo, 1970:16). As will be seen 
in the next section, social isolation is also very significant in terms of health. 
I will not refer to this kind of emotion work done for others outside the 
romantic relationships throughout this paper because, rather than being an issue of 
wrongfulness to the partner who does this work, I view it rather as the case of a loss 
of utility for the men who do not do this work. Being socially isolated without strong 
kinship relationships after the death of a spouse renders elderly widows vulnerable, 
which is a cost they bear, not their deceased wives. A further cost may be the 
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meaningfulness of their relationships. This is an empirical question about how 
meaningful people perceive relationships where not much emotion work is being 
performed. However, emotion work does not only serve to engender feelings in 
someone else, but also serves to strengthen the relationship and cultivate intimacy. 
Without emotion work, it is at least possible that the relationship will be impoverished 
as a result. Once again, this is a cost borne chiefly by the men who lose out on the 
meaningfulness of relationships, if they do indeed experience them as less 
meaningful.  
 
1.2.3. CARE  
 
It is unsurprising that women are expected to do most of the caring work. In a study 
by Paoletti (2002), which focused on the care of older relatives with disability, it was 
found that caring is only expected from male relatives if there were no female 
relatives or if the female relative was for some reason unable to care (814).  A study 
done on couples in Sweden in 2009 showed that women stayed home to care for sick 
children twice as often as their male partners, even though all parents in Sweden are 
entitled to paid leave to care for sick children (Eriksson and Nermo, 2009:344). 
Women thus take on the bulk of caring for the needs of other family members, even 
where structural impediments such as unequal or gendered paid leave have been 
removed. This is an indication of the extraordinary ideological hold of gendered 
patterns in heterosexual relations.  
However, for many marriages, the larger part of the health work that is done is 
maintenance and prophylactic rather than providing extra care due to illness, 
disability, or age. A wife managing her husband’s lifestyle for the sake of his health 
has become a trope in movies and literature. She might quietly warn him not to add 
extra salt, not to have an extra glass of wine, or a second helping of pork chops.  If the 
burden of cooking daily falls to the wife, the burden of cooking according to a 
restricted diet will also fall to her – whether it’s weighing foods, doing research on 
what causes cholesterol, or what foods are and are not allowed for a diabetic. Some 
parts of the work that health requires are of course outsourced to health workers, but 
preventative measures such as diet and exercise, as well as actually accessing health 
care, is work that cannot be outsourced to someone outside of the couple. Women are 
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far more likely than men to see a doctor both when they feel healthy (in other words, 
a check-up visit), and when they experience symptoms, and may also take on the 
work of ensuring their male partners go to the doctor in the case of illness or in the 
case of check-ups (Galdas et al., 2004:617). It may also fall to the female partner to 
ensure her partner takes his medication or follows lifestyle regiments. However, there 
are several reasons that this work should not fall to one partner only.  
All married people experience a health benefit in the form of social control, on 
which the management of chronic disease in part depends, since spouses are the most 
frequent source of social control for such management of disease for married people 
(August and Sorkin, 2010:1832). However, there is a gender discrepancy: whereas 
over 80% of men name their spouse as being an important source of influence and 
regulation, only 59% of women do (August and Sorkin, 2010:1832). That means that 
for more than 40% of women, their spouses are not an important source of social 
control for their health, which is more than double the men who do not receive this 
social control from their spouses. In this study, which looked at the management of 
type 2 diabetes, the married men in the sample received the most social control, and 
unmarried men received the least social control of all (unmarried women receive less 
social control than married women, but more than unmarried men) (August and 
Sorkin, 2010:1836). Further, though most people in the study experienced gratitude in 
response to social control, women experienced far more gratitude, which once again 
hints at who is held accountable for the provision of nurturing work, as well as what 
women feel they can expect from their spouses (August and Sorkin; 2010: 1837). This 
echoes the greater gratitude that women feel towards men for their contribution to 
household labour, whereas men feel comparatively little gratitude for the same.  
In general, ‘women possess more health-related knowledge, are more likely to 
monitor their own health status, and are less likely to engage in a number of risky 
health behaviors’ (August and Sorkin, 2010:1833). On the other hand, one qualitative 
study (O’Brien et al. 2005) showed that, for men, ‘there was a widespread reluctance 
to seek help (or to be seen to be seeking help) as such behaviour was seen as 
challenging to conventional notions of masculinity’ (514). This, however, places an 
additional care burden on the female partner.  
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A good example of this kind of burden is the account that this anonymous 
woman posted on a weblog of the responsibility she takes for her husband’s health 
after he is diagnosed with type 2 diabetes.3  She points out that she does this for 
selfish reasons, since she’d rather he didn’t die an early death, but here is her 
anecdote:  
 
[…]on Monday, as my husband was getting ready to travel to an on-site job 
for a few days, I asked him if he wanted a protein shake with his breakfast, 
because I knew he had a karate class later that night, and wouldn’t really 
have much time to eat properly during the day […] There was some 
agonizing, and then yes, he wanted the shake. Awesome. Great. Then he 
said to me, as he was eating and I had sat down at the table to do some kind 
of crap household paperwork, that he wished he could avoid making 
decisions about what/when to eat. That he found it mentally tiring to be 
asked these questions and it would just be wonderful if I removed the 
element of choice entirely, and just gave him whatever it was he was 
supposed to eat. Because thinking about food all the time, when there are so 
many other things he needs to be thinking about is just too much 
sometimes.   
(user: skybluepink, page 17) 
 
This account illustrates several useful things: firstly, the kind of burden that 
taking responsibility for someone’s health maintenance is. This woman has to 
consider her partner’s schedule for that day and determine in advance what his 
physical needs might be throughout the course of the day. The magnitude of the task 
and the mental energy it requires is laid bare by this example. Secondly, she has to 
take into account his preferences on an ongoing basis – she mentions earlier in this 
account that she adjusts what she feeds him based on whatever her partner is reading 
about diabetes at that moment. Thirdly, it illustrates how this man has an 
unquestioned assumption that his partner ought to take all responsibility for his health 
maintenance, where even his minor participation is too burdensome for him.  																																																																				
3	A weblog is an online forum where anyone can contribute a post. This one is particular was on 
MetaFilter, and people (mostly women) posted about their experiences of doing more emotion work.  
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The work of maintaining health falling to only one partner has some pragmatic 
and utilitarian costs. The first reason is that if the work is delegated to one’s partner, 
the skills required to manage illness, treat symptoms, or to take preventative measures 
are never acquired. This is a problem, firstly, because one’s partner is not always 
present, and simply cannot administer every insulin injection, or ensure every day that 
the daily statin is taken, or make sure that every meal eaten falls within a restricted 
meal plan. If the couple is separated, even if briefly, for example due to travelling 
separately, the male partner will lack the necessary skills to take care of his health 
when his female partner is absent. This is, firstly, inefficient: if such separations occur 
frequently, the health measures will simply be too infrequently enforced to be 
effective. Let us take high cholesterol as an example. If the meals at home are 
carefully monitored for cholesterol content, but the husband eats whatever he likes all 
through the day for his lunch and his snacks, then the restrictive diet will not be as 
effective as necessary in order to lower cholesterol. Further, if a wife is not present at 
every occasion where a statin is to be taken, it may result in statins rarely being taken, 
which also renders them ineffective. If the issue is a symptom that is not manifestly 
obvious, it is also simply impossible for a female partner to intuit these and insist her 
partner goes to the doctor. It may even restrict the caregiving partner’s freedom of 
movement if she is aware that the maintenance of health is dependent on her presence. 
If the work of health care (and possessing those skills that enable it) is the 
exclusive domain of the woman, it will also be the case that if her partner or another 
family member falls ill, it will be her responsibility to take care of her partner or 
children. This cannot be a reciprocal feature of the relationship – the male partner is 
likely to lack both the skills and the will (through lack of emotion work on the self) to 
administer caringly to his female partner should she fall ill (she will have to croak 
precise instructions from her sickbed). Since one of the goods of a relationship is 
sometimes being taken care of, at least when one is ill, this results in the female 
partner being denied a primary good of being partnered. Additionally, if a child falls 
ill and the father lacks the confidence in his skills (or, indeed, if the mother lacks 
confidence in his skills) in taking care of a child, it will, by default, be the 
responsibility of the mother to take care of the child, even if it means skipping work. 
This perpetuates the problematic fact of women being far more likely to make 
sacrifices in their careers in order to do family work. It may even result in a mother 
not quite trusting her husband to take care of the children when she is absent, if he 
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cannot, firstly, notice when one of them is ill, and, secondly, know what to do about 
it.  
This is not to say that health should always remain solely each partner’s 
responsibility – as previously mentioned, one of the values of being partnered instead 
of single is that one does not always have to take care of oneself. For example, 
reciprocal tending to illness is desirable. Providing input when one becomes 
concerned about one’s partner’s health, or encouraging one’s partner to engage in 
healthier behaviours, is also appropriate. However, this should be reciprocal and 
mutual, and each partner must take final responsibility for his or her own health for 
the reasons listed above. Then, when one’s partner shows concern, it has the quality 
of a purer kind of emotion work rather than care work responding to an actual urgent 
need. These reasons are utilitarian and pragmatic, but the rest of the paper will also 
show that not only is it detrimental to men to distribute nurturing work unequally, it is 
also unfair for a female partner to have to singly take on these responsibilities per 
default.  
 
 1.3. THE BIOLOGICAL OBJECTION 
 
I have looked at some potential explanations of the unequal distribution of work 
which are not merely gender-based, including relative time availability and relative 
income. However, it is necessary to refute one final claim that is made about the 
distribution of work which would make it an amoral discussion and therefore make 
the work of this paper impossible: that nurturing work is distributed the way it is 
because of the different innate abilities of men and women due to their biological sex. 
The discussion would become amoral because being able to do something is a 
necessary condition for being morally obligated to do it, and if men are not capable of 
doing nurturing work because of some feature of their biology, then they cannot be 
obligated to do it. Specifically, the idea must be considered that women are endowed 
with natural empathetic abilities, perhaps springing from their superior abilities in the 
use of language: women are supposedly better at discerning emotion, reading social 
cues and offering appropriate emotional support. This difference is supposedly ‘hard-
wired’ into the female brain, whereas the male brain is simply less able to do such 
nurturing work (Fine, 2010:15). 
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In her excellent book, Delusions of Gender, Cordelia Fine refutes gender roles 
and characteristics attributed to biological sex. She examines studies which seem to 
indicate a gendered difference in empathising ability, notably the ones conducted by 
Simon Baron-Cohen. According to these studies, which included questionnaires 
where people rate their own empathetic abilities, women were far more likely to 
consider themselves empathetic than men. According to this self-reporting, at least 
half of women have an “E-type” brain (an empathetic brain – or, as re-dubbed by 
Baron-Cohen – a ‘female brain’). This is as opposed to only 17% of men who, 
according to this self-reporting, have a ‘female brain’ (Fine, 2010:16). However, as 
Fine points out, testing people for their empathising abilities through self-reporting is 
similar to testing mathematical ability by asking people if they are good at 
mathematics.  
In studies that actually test for empathetic abilities – for example, determining 
emotions from a picture of someone’s eyes, or attempting to read emotional subtext in 
an interaction, women do have a modest advantage. However, when a financial 
reward is offered (for example, $2 for every correct answer), men and women 
perform equally well in a test (Fine, 2010:21). Motivation can also be offered in the 
form of social value: if male participants are told that men with better empathising 
skills are more sexually successful and more likely to be seen leaving a bar with a 
woman they just met, men also perform much better on these empathising tests than 
without this information. It seems, then, that women consistently seem to be better at 
empathising because there is always a social motivation for doing so, whereas men 
need extra motivation.  
This is confirmed by the fact that men do seem entirely capable of doing 
emotional work at work. Psychotherapy is a classic example of such emotion work, 
and men are clearly able to do this when being paid to. Similarly, the emotional 
labour of maintaining social relationships which usually falls to the female partner in 
heterosexual relationships is effortlessly performed by men in the workplace in the 
guise of “networking”. When it offers financial reward, men implicitly understand 
that sending a gift or a Christmas card is a trivial gesture in itself, but is significant 
because of the work it represents in cementing and maintaining an important 
relationship.  
The extent of innate sex difference (in other words, hard-wired difference that 
is the result of biology) is, it seems, still an open question. There are many studies 
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showing that hormones are determinant of behaviours, and studies that show the 
opposite, and studies that show that the ‘male brain’ and the ‘female brain’ are 
distinct and correspond to sex, and studies which show the opposite. However, I do 
not need to prove that there are no innate differences between men and women, and 
the above study is enough to show that, under the right circumstances, men are 
equally capable of nurturing work as women.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this chapter was to lay down the definitions of concepts I will be relying 
on in my arguments that follow, specifically explaining the constellation of different 
kinds of effort that make up nurturing work. I have argued that nurturing work has 
three elements which cannot be separated: housework, care, and emotion work. In the 
rest of my thesis I may refer to only one of these elements, since there are some points 
that are particular to, for instance, emotion work, but for the most part I will be 
referring to nurturing work.  
Secondly, I set out to show that the status quo of the distribution of labour 
between heterosexual partners is significantly unequal, and therefore the moral 
arguments that follow are pertinent to men and women in heterosexual relationships. 
The chapters which follow are theoretical, so all I need to argue is that if there is an 
unequal division of nurturing work between partners, it would be wrongful for the 
reasons I will present. Nevertheless, the empirical groundwork I have laid shows the 
practical relevance and indeed urgency of this work. 
Finally, I have attempted to eliminate objections to the idea that the unequal 
distribution of nurturing work is a case of gendered injustice. I have shown that 
gender is the greatest predictor of how much work one does in the (heterosexual) 
family, regardless of income, time, gender ideology, and the ways in which one 
perceives one’s own gender identity. This indicates that it is an issue of gendered 
injustice. I also excluded the biological objection because if valid, this would remove 
this work from the domain of moral theory: if men are biologically and physically 
incapable of taking on more nurturing work, there can be no moral obligation to do 
so. This is not the case – men are perfectly able to do nurturing work if the motivation 
is strong enough. As such, they can be morally obligated to do more work. The rest of 
this thesis will therefore treat the unequal distribution of nurturing work as a potential 
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moral issue, specifically an instance of wrongfulness. The next chapter begins this 
project by determining whether it is a case of injustice, and if so, of what type, and 
thus whether it falls within the realm of political philosophy. 
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CHAPTER TWO: CONTRACT 
INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter showed that the unequal distribution of labour cannot be 
justified by biology, nor by any other contingent factor such as free time or wage 
discrepancies. Given that the allocation of labour is virtually automatic according to 
sex, we should be suspicious that this may be wrong. Given that this affects most 
women and most men, we may also suspect that this is an issue of justice. As such, 
feminist liberals have used liberal theories of justice in order to frame this as a case of 
injustice. Further, they have attempted to use a liberal device to amend this: the 
contract. 
This chapter looks at two different strategies for employing the contract. The 
first attempts to use a contract between individuals as a means for testing for the 
presence of exploitation in a relationship. I will introduce this section by examining 
the individual contract and its role in the liberal tradition, as well as the marriage 
contract, using Susan Mendus. I will then look at how Jean Hampton appropriates this 
liberal tool for a feminist purpose.  Hampton formulates what she calls a 
‘contractualist test’ that draws on both Kantian and Hobbesian contractarianism and is 
meant to counteract tendencies that women have to be self-sacrificing. The second 
strategy is employed by Susan Moller Okin, and instead of using a hypothetical 
contract between individuals, she makes use of the Rawlsian social contract in order 
to argue for certain policy recommendations that she believes will rectify the issue of 
unequal distribution of labour; she is thus more concerned about institutional justice.  
I will argue that Okin’s is the better argument: her argument is theoretically 
sound and in keeping with liberalism, and more importantly, her policy 
recommendations are sensible and likely to be helpful for the distribution of 
household work and childcare. Nevertheless, her policy recommendations are unlikely 
to change any aspect of nurturing work apart from housework, and, crucially, it would 
not be possible to amend those recommendations to do so, since the theoretical 
justification for intervention in the form of regulation does not hold for other aspects 
of nurturing work. Hampton’s contractualist test may prove to have psychological 
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value in the raising of feminist consciousness, but ultimately its formulation is such 
that it cannot test whether the distribution of nurturing work is exploitative. Feminist 
liberalism will thus be shown to have some use in establishing fairness in 
relationships, but nurturing work is beyond the field of its application.  
 
2.1. MARRIAGE AND CONTRACT 
2.1.1 LIBERALISM AND THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 
 
In her book, Feminism and Emotion (2000), Susan Mendus gives a useful overview of 
the liberal view of the marriage contract. Under a liberal framework, the way in which 
‘private’ relationships (and here I am referring to relationships between citizens, 
usually business transactions) have been regulated is through the mechanism of the 
contract. The contract is justified theoretically by two aspects of liberalism: firstly, the 
notion of autonomy, and secondly, the notion of ownership of one’s body. Given that 
we are autonomous, when we freely enter into a contract, this is the source of the 
legitimacy of the agreement. The second justification is the notion that each person 
has ownership in her body, since no individual has any natural right over any 
individual except herself, and may contract on this basis, selling her labour or time. 
According to this justification, a contract must be mutually advantageous, with an 
equal distribution of costs and benefits, in order for the contract to be legitimate.  
Liberals have applied these notions to the marriage contract as well. Mendus 
explains that since liberals seek to legitimise power structures through the mechanism 
of contract, and since marriage is an instance of a power structure, it stands to reason 
that the contract can be used to legitimise marriage as well (2000:87). She however 
disagrees with this approach, since she find problems with both the notion of 
consenting to the marriage contract, as well as viewing the marriage contract as being 
justified by the fact that it is mutually advantageous. Firstly, she argues that the notion 
of autonomy used by liberals is unrealistic, which applies to all contracts, including 
marriage. Even if the contract is entered into freely, there are factors that could place 
the contracting parties in unequal positions relative to each other, such as differences 
in knowledge and power (91). Morally arbitrary factors will always interfere with 
someone’s decision to enter into a contract – ‘they may be bad judges of their own 
needs, bad judges of risk, or simply ignorance of the value of the goods being 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 27	
exchanged’ (91). For Mendus, the requirement of voluntariness is useful in 
determining whether or not a contract was freely entered into, which is important, but 
insufficient in determining whether or not the contract is legitimate.  This is because 
voluntariness is not proof of autonomy due to the contingent factors such as differing 
levels of knowledge and power, and can therefore not by itself impart legitimacy to an 
agreement. Since autonomy cannot confer legitimacy, the terms of the contract must 
be (objectively) fair in order to make it legitimate (2000:92). 
Secondly, then, the marriage contract can be seen as being justified by the fact 
that it is mutually advantageous to the contracting parties. Given that the mere fact of 
voluntary consent is insufficient to legitimise the contract, the terms of the contract 
need to be fair; in other words, the costs and benefits need to be distributed fairly and 
equitably (93). This construes marriage as a kind of business relationship, where the 
parties strike a bargain. The first problem with this view is that marriage contracts 
simply do not work like this – the terms of a marriage contract are unalterable and 
externally defined, which was once hierarchical but is now technically non-
hierarchical. The law, rather than the contracting parties, decides the terms of a 
marriage contract. For example, one can choose what kind of financial arrangement 
one prefers in a marriage by electing a marriage in community of property or outside 
of it, which can be amended with the addition of an antenuptial agreement. However, 
even these options are defined beforehand, and a couple is not permitted to strike a 
bargain unique to their agreement. 
Jean Hampton opts for a different route: she uses contractarianism not to alter 
the marriage contract, but to formulate a test for a good relationship. She draws on 
Hobbesian contractarianism as well as Kantian contractarianism to formulate a test for 
fairness in the terms of a relationship.   
 
2.1.2 JEAN HAMPTON’S FEMINIST CONTRACTARIANISM  
 
In her famous essay, “Feminist Contractarianism” (2007), Hampton draws on 
two kinds of contractarianism to formulate a test for the presence of exploitation in a 
relationship. She frames this as an antidote to what she sees as women’s tendency to 
be overly self-sacrificing in relationships at the unreasonable expense of their own 
interests. She says that her test can be used to evaluate any private, intimate 
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relationship, including friendships, but she does place a special emphasis on 
heterosexual romantic relationships, and many of her examples are of wives and 
mothers.  Her contractarian test is as follows: 
 
Given the fact that we are in this relationship, could both of us reasonably 
accept the distribution of costs and benefits (that is, the costs and benefits 
that are not themselves side effects of any affective or duty-based tie 
between us) if it were the subject of an informed, unforced agreement in 
which we think of ourselves as motivated solely by self-interest? 
(Hampton, 2007:21) 
 
This formulation will be unpacked once we have looked at the background 
that motivates this test. Hampton’s concern for women who are overly self-sacrificing 
is framed in terms of ethics of care. She uses Carol Gilligan’s interviews with children 
in which she found that the moral development of girls and boys differ – boys develop 
a justice-based ethics first, whereas girls develop a care-based ethics. Hampton uses 
two children that Gilligan interviewed as paradigmatic examples of each position, 
where Jake represents a justice-based ethics, and Amy represents a care-based ethic 
(2007:5). It is clear that the boy, Jake, errs on the side of acting perhaps too much in 
self-interest, where his idea of morality is ‘pursuing one’s own interest without 
damaging the interests of others’ (4), whereas for Amy, the girl, morality means 
putting others before oneself in apparently most scenarios: according to Amy, you 
should put your relationships before yourself ‘but to the extent that it is really going to 
hurt you or stop you from doing something that you really want, then I think maybe 
you should put yourself first’ (3, emphasis added). Hampton draws attention to Amy’s 
view that even in the case where one could really be hurt by putting others’ interests 
before one’s own, one should only maybe put oneself first. Hampton finds this a 
serious source of concern, especially if a woman like Amy ends up in a relationship 
with someone like Jake, where their respective ‘gendered’ moralities will make it 
likely that Amy will be exploited by Jake.  
Some feminists read Hampton’s concern about exploitability as being against 
ethics of care. For example, Ruth Sample (2002) suggests that if one agrees that doing 
care work is a virtue, women should not necessarily object to doing more of it (260). 
Further, if one frames the distribution of care work in terms of distributive justice, as 
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Hampton does, then it is being distributed as any other burden is, without being given 
special status as virtuous or celebrated – it may devalue care work in the eyes of 
proponents of ethics of care (Sample, 2002:261). Ruth Abbey, however, disagrees: 
she argues that Hampton is rather trying to present a more robust form of care ethics, 
where the consistent application of care means that the caregiver is obligated to care 
for herself as well as for others (2013:125-126). Caring for oneself is a requirement 
for healthy relationships, and so Hampton is prioritising relationships, including the 
relationship to oneself, which is characteristic of an ethics of care (126). The test that 
Hampton proposes is thus not privileging an ethics of justice over an ethics of care, 
but rather drawing on justice to strengthen and extend care.  
The theoretical justification for Hampton’s contractarian test draws on both 
what she calls ‘Hobbesian contractarianism’ and ‘Kantian contractarianism’. 
Hobbesian contractarianism, says Hampton, is characterised by total self-interest. 
That is, the contract imposes no moral obligation, but it is in the contracting parties’ 
self-interest to enter into the contract (11).  The contracting parties will then insist on 
not being exploited by the contract, since this would be against their self-interest. For 
Hampton, the advantage of this position is that it involves little metaphysics – it is a 
simplified ‘morality’ where morality is reduced to mutual advantage. In contrast, 
Kantian contractarianism, says Hampton, is a mechanism to ascertain moral 
principles, and as such does impose moral obligations (14).  
In general, she prefers the Kantian position, and this is because Hobbesian 
contractarianism leaves no room for the intrinsic worth of persons. One only 
cooperates with others insofar as it is beneficial to oneself, and as such, people can 
only have instrumental value (11). This she considers to be a failure in capturing the 
nature in morality. Kantian contractarianism, on the other hand is premised on the 
intrinsic moral worth of persons, and for this reason is a much better account of 
morality. Hampton nevertheless will retain one element of Hobbesian 
contractarianism: acting in self-interest and making sure one gets what one deserves 
in interactions with others. 
Hampton chiefly uses Rawls as an example of Kantian contractarianism, and 
in doing so addresses the most common feminist critique of Rawls. For Rawls, the 
social contract is designed from the Original Position, which is behind the ‘veil of 
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ignorance’4. This entails that everyone is stripped of their socially defined identities in 
order to find a ‘transcultural truth’, but feminists argue that our being is so rooted in 
social relationships that ‘easy intuitions remaining after people are supposedly 
stripped to their bare essentials will still be permeated with the assumptions of a sexist 
society, producing (not surprisingly) “patriarchal outcomes”’ (14-15). This occurs in 
two ways: firstly, these biases are likely to be present in the very assumptions and 
constraints that form the background to the formulation of the contract. For example, 
the fact that people in the original position are expected to make decisions based on 
self-interest and while disregarding emotion-based attachments to other people could 
be an instance of a masculine bias that the veil of ignorance would not counteract (16-
17). Secondly, if it is the case that masculine biases are pervading the original 
position process, then it is possible that they influence or determine the outcome of 
the original position procedure. If this is the case, and the maximin5 principle cannot 
be justified by the original position argument, then all we are left with are ‘vague 
intuitive appeals’ to the maximin principle (17).  
Hampton is not extremely sympathetic to this feminist critique - she argues 
that an ‘Archimedean point’ which is not entirely explicable by context is necessary 
for feminists as well: ‘they not only want their values to predominate, they want them 
do so because they are the right values’ (15-16).  
Hampton thus finds existing contractarian theories of both the Hobbesian and 
the Kantian traditions unsatisfactory from a feminist perspective: she dislikes the 
masculine bias in the Kantian traditions (including the Rawlsian version), and dislikes 
the instrumentalisation of people necessitated by the Hobbesian approach. 
Nevertheless, she finds the idea of contract an appealing tool which, if amended, 
could become a feminist device. Hampton believes that the contract can be used to 
																																																																				
4 Rawls proposes the Original Position as a means to determine the principles of justice according to 
which we should organise society. He suggests that this takes place behind a veil of ignorance, where 
everyone is stripped of their defining characteristics, and could theoretically occupy any position in 
society. As such, people will decide in self-interest, but which is not based on their identity - in other 
words, it is the self-interest of the anonymous citizen rather than an existing citizen with partisan 
interests.	
5 The maximin position is one of the ways in which people will decide in the original position: because 
one might reenter society as anyone, including the person who is worst off in that society, those in the 
original position would, according to the Rawlsian wager, choose to maximise the minimum that 
anyone in society gets, so that the worst off in this societal structure would be better off than in any 
other societal structure.  
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make ‘a moral evaluation of any relationship’ including those in the private sphere, 
such as that of family and friendships, as well as romantic relationships. The moral 
evaluation is specifically to ascertain if the relationship is just. She does not define 
what she means by justice, but she makes it clear that at the very least, it means the 
absence of exploitation. Once again, she does not make explicit what she means by 
‘exploitation’, so I will assume she is using the standard definition: ‘A wrongfully 
exploits B when A takes unfair advantage of B’ (Wertheimer, 1996:12).  
Instead of seeing love as voiding the need for justice, as many political 
philosophers have, including canonical political philosophers such as David Hume 
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Hampton sees the presence of affection and duty instead 
as precisely the point of vulnerability which can be exploited. As she puts it, ‘one’s 
propensity to give gifts out of love or duty should not become the lever that another 
party who is capable of reciprocating relies upon to get one to maintain a 
relationship to one’s cost’ (2007:21).  Hampton’s paradigm example of this occurring 
is a mother whose love for her family is used by her family to ensure that she does 
extra work for them without reciprocation or compensation. The fact that she works 
without receiving anything in return means that she bears all the costs, and those 
whom she loves and does work for receive all the benefits, which makes it a losing 
situation for her. 
Now let’s return to Hampton’s formulation of her contractarian test. The test 
demands that the distribution of costs and benefits be evaluated for fairness and 
equitability, but she excludes costs and benefits ‘that are not themselves side effects 
of any affective or duty-based tie’ (2007:21). Presumably, a duty-based tie might be 
something like a parent-child relationship, where the distribution of costs and benefits 
are typically the result of the duty one has to care for one’s child. Further, though she 
refers to an ‘affective or duty-based tie’, it seems that she actually means that the 
affective side effects of a relationship should not be taken into account. I say this 
because the examples she provides are as follows: ‘the pain a parent feels when her 
teenage child gets into trouble, the happiness felt by someone because of the 
accomplishments of her friend, the suffering of a woman because of the illness of a 
parent’ (21). These all seem to be examples of positive and negative emotions that are 
felt due to the intimacy of the relationship. Therefore, I will assume that it is positive 
and negative emotions that are being left out of the calculation of the distribution of 
costs and benefits. 
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Hampton justifies her exclusion of affect and duty firstly, because she believes 
that these can blind one to what is in one’s self-interest. She believes that it is 
precisely one’s love and affection for others that it taken advantage of – that is used as 
the ‘lever that another party […] relies upon to get one to maintain the relationship at 
one’s cost’ (2007:21). Her key example is that of the housewife whose family uses 
her love and affection for them to get her to do more work for them than they do for 
her. Secondly, she states that affection and duty ‘cannot be distributed and are outside 
the province of justice’ (21). She suggests the positive and negative emotions felt due 
to intimacy cannot be distributed to someone else (for example, one cannot and 
presumably would not want to redistribute the concern a mother feels for her child). 
Further, the test she is developing does not test for equality, but instead whether 
someone could reasonably agree to the distribution of costs and benefits. As Linda 
Radzik explains, for Hampton, this need not involve optimising one’s situation so that 
one can receive the maximum benefits given the situation, but rather, the distribution 
should merely be such that a reasonable person could agree to them (2005:49).  
Hampton touches on the role that consent plays in her vision of the contract, 
but argues that consent could only truly occur if the terms of the contract are fair (26). 
As we have seen, consent and fairness of terms (in other words, whether or not the 
contract is mutually advantageous) are two separate criteria for giving a contract 
legitimacy, which have different theoretical bases in liberalism. However, Hampton 
frames her contract is an ideal one rather than a morally neutral device, which means 
it is ‘fed by normative ideas that one is ultimately relying on when using the test to 
make moral evaluations’ (26). This means that the idea of intrinsic worth built into the 
very idea of the contract, and if it is not present, it cannot be this kind of ideal 
contract. For this reason it would be impossible, in principle, to freely or 
autonomously consent to a contract unfair to oneself  because it disrespects one’s 
intrinsic worth. According to a Kantian perspective, says Hampton, a contract that is 
not at least minimally mutually advantageous necessarily entails an implicit disrespect 
for the losing party. Hampton further emphasises that the Kantian respect for persons 
also entails equal respect for oneself (23). One cannot therefore autonomously 
consent to a contract that degrades one’s moral worth.  
 
2.1.3. CRITIQUES OF A CONTRACTARIAN TEST FOR INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 
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Abbey argues that the device of the contract in Hampton’s theory is purely 
metaphorical and does no normative or theoretical work (2011:128) She argues that 
Hampton’s theory is simply Kantian feminism, where the introduction of Hobbes as 
well as the device of the contract are superfluous. Firstly, Abbey suggests that 
Hampton relies so little on the contract that her position might more aptly be called 
‘Kantian feminism’ rather than ‘feminist contractarianism’. Hampton states that her 
ideal form of the contract means that one can only consent to a contract that respects 
one’s intrinsic worth. Of course, not all contracts function this way, such as the 
Hobbesian kind of contract that instrumentalises others, or an employment contract 
that exploits the employee. Hampton uses the meaning of contract univocally, in such 
a way that it is synonymous with a Kantian respect for persons.  If we recall Mendus’ 
distinction between autonomy and fair terms as different ways of legitimising 
contract, it is clear that Hampton only acknowledges the latter, since she believes 
‘true consent’ is predicated on fair terms.   
Abbey also argues that the inclusion of Hobbes into the theoretical 
justification of Hampton’s formulation of the contractual test is not only superfluous 
but possibly also harmful to her argument. It is superfluous because, Abbey argues, 
one does not require the explicit inclusion of self-interest in order to achieve the kind 
of justice Hampton is after (i.e., distributive justice of non-affective costs/benefits). 
The Kantian position that everyone has intrinsic moral worth naturally includes the 
woman in question herself, and so already implies an obligation to consider oneself as 
equally important as people with whom one is in relationship (2011:129). Hampton 
includes Hobbes so that the woman in question will insist on not being exploited, but 
exploitation (if it can be considered treating people as means to an end instead of ends 
in themselves) is already prohibited by the demand to respect others’ intrinsic worth 
(129). In fact, argues Abbey, the inclusion of Hobbes risks misrepresenting 
Hampton’s position and making it unappealing to feminists: since she explicitly 
includes self-interest as the test for exploitation, it may seem that she is 
instrumentalising relationships in the same way Hobbes does (130). Hampton does 
not actually do this, given her emphasis on intrinsic rather than instrumental value, 
and moreover she states that there can only be real love in a relationship if there is 
also respect for the intrinsic value of one’s friend or partner. She also acknowledges 
that people’s motivations for entering into a relationship with someone is neither 
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instrumental, nor in order to pursue justice, but have to do with different factors 
altogether (such as love).  
If Abbey is right, Hampton’s theory could be streamlined by leaving out 
Hobbes altogether. However, Hampton is not simply making an abstract philosophical 
argument: she has identified a tendency in women which is socialised rather than 
natural, and it seems to me that she is trying to provide a tool to counteract that 
psychological tendency. Let us examine the alternative (stripped down) formulation to 
Hampton’s contractarian test that Abbey provides, given the above arguments: ‘could 
we accept this [relationship] if we think of ourselves as beings with intrinsic worth, 
whose worth warrants respect from all humans capable of extending it?’ (130). This 
formulation excludes an evaluation of the distribution of costs and benefits, and 
therefore whether self-interest would dictate that one ought to stay in the relationship 
because the (non-affective) benefits outweigh the costs of being in the relationship – 
in other words, because one gets at least as much as one gives. Rather, one asks 
whether one’s intrinsic worth is respected by the relationship, and the only way to 
determine this is to ascertain if the relationship is exploitative.  
Abbey points out that this contractarian test is an act of feminist 
consciousness-raising that allows a woman to get the required distance from 
relationships so that she can test them for exploitation (2011:127). If she is right, and I 
think she is, then the test serves a primarily psychological function, rather than 
positing a moral position.  Therefore, though Abbey’s formulation may well more 
simply and accurately represent Hampton’s Kantian feminism, it would not serve the 
psychological purpose equally well. If a woman were to ask herself Hampton’s 
version, she may well acknowledge that the distributive arrangement of burdens in her 
relationship is contra her self-interest. According to Abbey’s formulation, however, 
this means that she would also have to admit that her relationship is unacceptable 
because her intrinsic worth is not respected or recognised. The latter seems to be a far 
more drastic conclusion than the former – it seems to imply vicious sexism rather than 
a lack of distributive justice, and may thus not ring true to the woman who applies the 
test to her relationship. The deliberate inclusion of self-interest in the test is a way to 
ensure that one’s intrinsic worth is respected by repressing the tendency to be self-
sacrificing in a relationship, since women are socialised to put the well-being of 
others and the relationship above their own needs. 
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Although the point has been argued above that love does not void the demand 
for justice, the presence of love nevertheless complicates the question, ‘does my 
partner value my intrinsic worth?’ Because it is an intimate relationship, it is highly 
unlikely to be merely instrumental – if a man viewed his partner entirely 
instrumentally, he would view her as replaceable by any woman who could perform 
the work equally well. It is improbable that many (if any) relationships are actually 
such a brute bargain. It is more likely that a man loves his wife for her particular 
characteristics and personality, which means that he recognises her intrinsic worth. 
This may not mean that he respects her in the ways in which Kantian morality would 
demand given her equal intrinsic moral worth, which, Hampton suggests, could never 
allow exploitation.  Nevertheless, since the answer to Abbey’s formulation sounds 
much more vicious, which would be that the problem with the relationship is an 
absence of respect for intrinsic worth, it is less likely to be helpful to a woman 
employing it.  
This is not a philosophical point, but rather a psychological one. Hampton’s 
moral position can be summarised as follows: given the equal worth of persons, one 
must recognise one’s own worth and realise that this imposes a moral obligation on 
others to treat you with respect, and on you to insist on such treatment. Hampton 
emphasises the woman’s perspective and obligations in this scenario: women have a 
moral Kantian duty to not allow themselves to be exploited. However, it is possible to 
extrapolate from her Kantian perspective that exploitation is forbidden, and in order to 
respect the intrinsic and equal moral worth of persons, men may also not acquiesce to 
a distributive arrangement that is exploitative of their wives, and in fact it seems 
wrong-headed to focus on individual women ‘allowing’ their partners to disrespect 
their intrinsic worth.  What is problematic about this is that it makes the party more 
likely to be exploited responsible for rectifying the situation. In fact, Ruth Sample 
makes a convincing argument for why focusing on an individual woman’s assessment 
of whether or not her relationship serves her self-interest is nonsensical without taking 
societal conditions into account. 
In her paper, Why Feminist Contractarianism? (2002), Sample provides some 
critiques of Hampton’s position, the most compelling of which is her argument that 
the exclusion of affective and duty-based ties is firstly, unjustified, and secondly, 
would imply the destruction of the family, as well as her argument that Hampton’s 
paper unfairly makes women seem irrational for being in exploitative relationships. 
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Sample offers an alternative account for when and why these kinds of relationships 
could be considered exploitative, according to her own definition of exploitation: 
when someone gains an advantage by disrespecting someone else’s intrinsic worth 
(2003: 56) 
Sample argues that the content of Hampton’s contract excludes too much: she 
suggests that including affective ties and duty is essential in calculating the utility of 
an existing arrangement. She suggests that the affect involved in nurturing work and 
household work could make the work not only tolerable but even joyous (269). This 
may well be the case for emotion work – as I have mentioned previously, emotional 
labour usually springs out of love (which nevertheless does not exclude it from the 
province of work). This is also plausible for childcare, naturally, but less plausible for 
housework, particularly cleaning. Nevertheless, given that, realistically, a woman’s 
options are either to have a family and have the benefits of that come from affective 
ties associated with the family under conditions of unequal work, or to not have a 
family, if a woman wants a family, she is rational in choosing to have a family under 
those conditions. It may be the case that a man making the same decision to opt into 
family life gets more utility from that decision, but given that a woman does not 
simply have the option of acquiring the same utility as a man, her decision maximises 
utility for herself, given her options, and therefore is a rational choice. It is important 
to note that Sample is not arguing that this makes the conditions of the relationship 
fair, but rather a woman’s decision to opt into that relationship, or to stay in that 
relationship, rational (269). 
So why does Hampton exclude affect and duty-based ties? She argues that 
they ‘cannot be distributed and are beyond the province of justice’ (Hampton, 
2007:21). Sample provides multiple counterarguments to this position. Firstly, is it the 
case that affective benefits cannot be distributed? Sample argues that since these 
benefits are often associated with roles, and roles can be distributed, it seems that 
affective benefits and benefits from duty-based ties can be distributed (2002:270). 
Since emotion work deliberately aims to evoke positive emotions in one’s 
interlocutor, and both partners can do emotion work, it seems that at least some 
positive emotions one feels are strongly associated with emotion work done by the 
partners.  
The exclusion of affect and duty-based ties should hint at the fact that 
Hampton’s contract would be useless in distributing nurturing work. It seems that, at 
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least much of the time, women would take responsibility for the health of their 
husbands out of love or a sense of duty, and the same would apply to doing the 
emotion work of feeding egos and tending wounds. Sample suggests the kinds of 
sacrifices made for one’s family can only be explained in light of one’s love for them, 
and in the case of duty-based ties such as a parent-child relationship, one’s duty to 
them. This is patently the case with childcare: if one were to disregard both one’s love 
for one’s children and one’s duty to one’s children, and to act only in self-interest, 
then no sacrifice as a parent could be intelligible. Further, if, for example, one makes 
sacrifices in one’s own career in order to support a move in one’s partner’s career, 
this would certainly not be explicable in terms of self-interest, but rather only in light 
of one’s affective ties or duty. This fact leads Sample to argue that no family would 
survive the test of the contract, since much behaviour in the family can only be 
explained by affective ties and duty rather than by self-interest; this might even be 
what most pertinently distinguishes family life from public life. 
 For example, if a woman is offered a promotion that involves moving to a 
different country, and her husband leaves his current job for a lower-paying job in the 
new country in order to support his wife’s career, he would suffer the costs of giving 
up his current job, as well as being separated from his friends and family and 
everything he is familiar with. With costs this great, it is hard to see what benefits 
would need to accrue to this man in order for him to make this decision out of pure 
self-interest. Of course, presumably he is not making this decision out of self-interest, 
but out of love and support of his wife. His behaviour cannot be explained by self-
interest, but is neither obviously irrational nor indicative of an exploitative 
relationship. Thus, according to Sample, if we apply the test strictly, it would 
‘demand the virtual abolition of the family’, since the kind of sacrifices we make are 
overall not in our self-interest and cannot be explained in those terms (2002:272). 
Furthermore, it is not clear that this relationship is unfair to the male partner because 
he has elected to make this sacrifice for his wife. It thus seems that, firstly, the kinds 
of decisions we make out of love cannot be tested using purely self-interest, and 
secondly, that one partner sacrificing more than the other is what makes the 
relationship unjust. In other words, there must be a reason other than an inequality of 
relative costs and benefits accruing to the respective partners that make a relationship 
unjust..  
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If we change the hypothetical case study to swap the gender roles, our 
intuitions may be slightly different: we may be more suspect of the justice of the 
situation if the female partner was the one who gave up her job to move with her male 
partner to a different country. This is because we suspect that this decision was less 
free because a woman typically faces greater restrictions in terms of her career purely 
on the basis of being a woman. Sample argues that, when women in relationships 
constantly sacrifice their own self-interest for the good of others, it is exploitative, but 
not because their preferences are irrational. Rather, it is exploitative because it takes 
place against an extra-familial, social, public background of injustice. Her preferences 
are not the natural outcome of her personality, her biology, or her reasoning, but the 
outcome of a socially constructed sexual inequality. 
Sample argues that the fact that women, on average, bear more of the costs 
and fewer benefits than the men with whom they are in relationships, is unjust 
because it is the product of oppression. Those ‘preferences’ into which women are 
socialised occur the way they do because they serve the patriarchy and detriment 
women. The options available to women are fewer than men (for example, a man can 
have all his childcare and chores done while still having a career, while usually 
women have to make sacrifices on both to have either), and this is why it is 
exploitation. Sample argues ‘gendered expectation and mutual awareness’ is what 
causes oppressive relationships: 
 
Because men expect that women will be more likely to act out of 
affection and loyalty, and because men are correct in that expectation, 
and because women expect that men are more likely to act out of self-
interest, and because women are correct in that expectation, this 
provides men with greater bargaining power within the family.  
(266-267) 
 
Sample is thus arguing that placing the contractarian test in the hands of an 
individual serves no purpose, because the way they ‘choose’ to design the distributive 
arrangement of their relationship is not really up to them. Rather, the way they have 
been socialised into their genders as a result of an unequal society, and the fact that 
this determines that there is often exploitation of the female partner, is the reason for 
injustice. Sample suggests that contractarianism may still be a useful tool, but only if 
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we use it to create a more just society. The next section explores exactly this: how can 
the social contract be used to make the family more just? 
 
2.2. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE FAMILY 
2.2.1. APPLICABILITY OF JUSTICE TO THE FAMILY 
 
Susan Moller Okin is a well-known feminist liberal who argues in her book, Justice, 
Gender and the Family (1989) that the family cannot be excluded from the purview of 
justice. Traditionally, political philosophy has seen the family as lying beyond justice. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example, argues that excluding women from political 
participation would not result in their interests not being taken into account – since 
men love their wives, they would always act in their best interest (Okin, 1989:26). 
Hume argues that justice is an inappropriate virtue for the family, since superior 
virtues rule the family (27), such as ‘spontaneous affection and generosity’ (28). 
However, Okin points out that the presence of ‘superior virtues’ does not exclude the 
necessity for justice: she agrees with Rawls, who names justice the primary virtue 
because it needs to be present in order for other virtues to be present. Further, this 
idealised vision of the family is inaccurate, or at least not the full picture: the 
prevalence of domestic violence indicates that spontaneous affection is not 
necessarily the rule that dictates all families. Okin also points out that what 
supererogation occurs in a family usually happens at the expense of the female 
members, where they are more likely to be self-sacrificing and not to claim what is 
‘due’ to them (31), which is exactly what Jean Hampton tries to address with her 
contractarian test.  
In the second place, she points out that the idea that the law has in fact left the 
family alone, and that feminism’s demand for intervention into the family is novel, is 
a convenient myth. Historically, the law has deliberately maintained the patriarchal 
structure of a marriage by defining it in hierarchical terms, and depriving women of 
their income and property once they are married. In the present day, the law dictates 
who may and who may not get married, what constitutes a family, when people may 
get divorced, and so on. As Okin points out, ‘the issue is not whether, but how the 
state intervenes’ (131), to shape, create and limit the ‘private sphere’. 
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Thirdly, Okin argues that the family is the site where we are first socialised 
into our genders. This is a high-stakes activity, given the lower status that women 
occupy. Okin relies on Nancy Chodorow’s paper, “Family Structure and Feminine 
Personality” (1974) to argue that the traditional gender division of labour in the home 
creates significant gender differences. Chodorow posits that the fact that children’s 
primary parent is most often their mother or a female surrogate affects the gender 
development for boys and girls. Girls are encouraged to identify with their female 
parent, and because she is present during their development, they develop personality 
characteristics that make them empathetic, good at nurturing, and psychologically 
connected with others (Okin, 1989:131-132). This makes them both suited to and 
interested in nurturing, and therefore also more likely to choose nurturing occupations 
(or to invest most of their time in their families) in adulthood. Boys, on the other 
hand, are encouraged to identify with their male parent, who is away for the greater 
part of the day engaged in activities the children know nothing about. As a result, 
boys prioritise autonomy above connection, and aspire to ‘public status’ rather than to 
be good nurturers (132); in fact, the domestic, maternal sphere is turned into that 
which they must transcend in order to become a man. 
Finally, the consequences of the division of labour in the home are not limited 
to the home, but rather permeate every level of a woman’s life (132). Their resulting 
absence (or at least comparatively very small presence) in positions of authority or 
high-status occupations6 means that women are still not associated with authority and 
competence, which also means that it is more difficult for individuals to break the 
status quo and pursue such positions as women. In fact, Okin argues that the 
vulnerabilities that are the consequence of the division of labour are grounds for 
regulation of the family – in other words, one of the reasons why justice applies to the 
family and why government regulation is necessary. The ways in which women are 
made vulnerable by marriage will now be explored, and then I will explain Okin’s 
																																																																				
6 In South Africa in August 2017, ‘women comprised 32% of Supreme Court of Appeal judges, 31% of 
advocates, 30% of ambassadors and 24% of heads of state-owned enterprises. If we take a brief look at 
the Top 40 JSE listed companies, only one company had a female CEO.’ 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/?p=10325 	
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argument that this constitutes grounds for (different) intervention into the family, and 
finally Okin’s policy recommendations for such intervention. 
2.3.2 VULNERABILITY BY MARRIAGE 
 
As previously mentioned, political philosophy has traditionally considered the 
family as being beyond the reach of justice. According to Okin, liberalism has only 
obliquely addressed the family: firstly, the family one is born into can act as an 
impediment to equality of opportunity, but this is only considered on an interfamily 
level – the inequality of opportunity between different families is of concern to the 
liberal paradigm (134). Secondly, it was considered a domain where justice was 
inappropriate, and moreover unnecessary - since the family is ruled by love, it has no 
need of justice. Finally, it has been considered as a school of justice, where future 
citizens are cultivated with a sense of justice (134). However, Okin believes that the 
family is currently a site of injustice, where the essential goods are unevenly 
distributed, including power, prestige, self-esteem, opportunities for self-
development, and both physical and economic security (136). For Okin, the division 
of labour within the household is clearly a question of justice because, 1) labour in 
heterosexual couples is nearly automatically allocated on the basis of an irrelevant 
innate characteristic, which is the kind of discrimination theorists of justice are 
typically interested in; 2) this automatic allocation persists throughout the years in 
which the couple have children, and the distribution remains unequal beyond that 
point – the problem is thus more or less permanent, rather than temporary; and 3) its 
impact on partnered women is so great that ‘it affects every sphere of [women’s] 
lives, from the dynamics of those marital relationships to their opportunities in the 
many spheres of life outside the household’ (Okin, 149). 
The impact specifically results in women being made vulnerable, and, as we 
will see, Okin takes this vulnerability to impose a special moral obligation to regulate 
marriage. She identifies three kinds of vulnerability associated with marriage: 
vulnerability in anticipation of marriage, vulnerability during marriage, and 
vulnerability due to separation or divorce. The first kind of vulnerability is due to the 
kinds of choices girls and women make based on their expectations that, firstly, they 
will get married and have children, and secondly, that they will be the primary parent 
(142). Because of these expectations, girls are less likely than boys to pursue 
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prestigious careers and less likely to prioritise financial independence (143). On the 
other hand, they are more likely to opt for careers that lend themselves to flexibility, 
or jobs that do not hold promise for career advancement (see Wiswall 2016). Boys 
conversely expect to be the primary breadwinner (and not be otherwise impeded by 
family responsibilities), and so make decisions for prestigious careers that entail 
advancement. Girls feel that they have to choose between having children and having 
careers, whereas no such dichotomy exists in the minds of boys. These facts that Okin 
brings up may seem to have aged more than her other data, but recent data from 
Sweden, which ranks fourth in the world in gender equality (World Economic Forum, 
2016:328), show that occupations involving care work and little chance of career 
advancement are far more likely to be occupied by women, such as being nursing 
assistant, personal care assistants, cleaners, and secretaries. There are parallel jobs 
mostly occupied by men such as truck driving, but there are fewer such jobs than 
those occupied by women (Statistics Sweden, 2016:57). Further, in a recent TED talk, 
the CEO of Facebook, Sheryl Sandberg, advises women not to start making career 
sacrifices until they are actually pregnant (2010). In her experience, women are likely 
to begin turning down career opportunities in anticipation of children long in advance 
of having children (see Strober, Miling and Chan 2001:132).  
When examining the vulnerability of women in marriages, Okin distinguishes 
between the case of housewives and of wage-working wives. Firstly, housewives do 
work fewer total hours than their husbands, but all of their work is unpaid (though 
they do receive a financial benefit in the form of maintenance). Okin lists the 
disadvantages of being a housewife as follows: much of the work is boring and 
unpleasant, her work is unscheduled (which means that sometimes it never stops), she 
cannot change jobs as easily, her lack of income means that, at best, she has less 
bargaining power than her husband, and, at worst, is dependent on the charity of her 
husband. She acquires no status from her work, but her status rather depends on that 
of her husband. Most dramatically, however, is that being a housewife makes it much 
more difficult to exit a relationship. As such, this makes them more vulnerable to 
abuse, and to tolerating unacceptable relationships in general (149-152). It is 
somewhat easier for a working woman to leave a marriage than housewives, but her 
lot during the marriage is arguably worse than that of the housewife. Whereas 
housewives work fewer hours than their husbands (paid and unpaid), working women 
work far more (see chapter 1), where the largest disparity is in the unpaid work that 
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they do. As such, the hours that she can spend on her paid work are far less than her 
husband can, which hinders her career advancement as well as her leisure 
opportunities. 
The vulnerability of women after separation or divorce is perhaps the most 
significant, particularly that of housewives. The career decisions made by both 
housewives and working wives during their marriage were likely rational given their 
marriage and relatively limited career options, but tend to be highly detrimental if 
they became single. Since being a housewife is not considered to lead to the 
acquisition of marketable skills, housewives are far less employable than almost any 
other group. Women who are wage earners but have made sacrifices in their careers 
for their families, such as working part-time, or giving up opportunities at work in 
order to be more available for their families, are also at a disadvantage compared to 
their husbands.  As such, even if the material assets of the marriage are divided 
equally, the most important asset is the male partner’s earning power. 
This, in addition to the gender pay gap, where women still earn 78 cents to the 
dollar, means that women are almost guaranteed to be financially worse off than their 
husbands. In addition to this, women are far more likely to be custodial parents 
(82,6% of custodial parents are women) (Grall, 2007:2), which means that their day-
to-day expenses are greater due to their larger households. Further, the day-to-day 
care of children continues to disadvantage them in their careers in a way that non-
custodial parents are not disadvantaged (Okin, 1989: 162). This is all borne out by a 
statistic from 1986 that Okin mentions: in the first year after separation, the standard 
of living of the male partner increases by 42%, and the that of the female partner 
drops by 73% (161). A statistic from a decade later, in 1996, indicates that the boost 
experienced by men is probably closer to 10%, and the drop experienced by women is 
27% (Peterson 1996), which is nevertheless significant. Further, a recent study from 
the United States indicates that custodial parents are twice as likely to be below the 
poverty line as anyone else (Grall, 2007:4). Thus, especially separated women are far 
worse off than women who have never been married, and certainly than their ex-
partners.  
Okin depends on Goodin’s argument in his book, Protecting the Vulnerable 
(1985), that we have an obligation to protect the vulnerable.  He claims that the 
special obligations we have to particular people are typically conceived of in terms of 
voluntarism – we have a duty to them because we elected to be in relationship with 
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them. He counters this by saying that our special obligations come from the 
vulnerability of those close to us rather than from the voluntariness of our relationship 
with them (Goodin, 1985:42). This argument applies both the interpersonal 
relationships and to the obligations of the state. Goodin argues that in interpersonal 
relationships, our intimates are vulnerable to us by virtue of their closeness to us, and 
for the same reason, we are in a particular position to protect them (1985:115). This 
gives us a duty to give them special consideration. He extrapolates this the obligations 
of the state: the moral community as a whole has a duty to protect the vulnerable, and 
as we share this duty collectively, we ought to ‘see to it that a cooperative scheme is 
set up and operates effectively to protect all the members of the community’ (153). 
This can be outsourced to the state, which, because of its relatively massive resources, 
has the greatest obligation to protect the vulnerable (153). Along with this, where 
vulnerability is socially created rather than a natural feature (like that of the infant), 
we must reduce vulnerability as far as possible. 
Given that we have an obligation to mitigate vulnerability where possible, 
Okin argues that different regulation of marriage is justified. Gender-structured 
marriage is a necessarily evil. We cannot prevent people from choosing it, but we 
must mitigate the vulnerability that is the consequence of that choice. To do that, 
marriage must be subject to the following regulations: firstly, both spouses should be 
equally entitled to the total income of the household for the duration of the marriage 
(Okin, 180). Okin suggests that half a person’s paycheck should be made out to their 
spouse. Okin suggests that for most couples this will simply formalise what is already 
the arrangement between a couple. Yet she hopes that this will rectify a power 
imbalance in a relationship, because it symbolically asserts that unpaid work is just as 
important as paid work, rather than attempting to compensate the home-making 
partner for services rendered (181). Secondly, divorce laws need to be changed so that 
women are protected from the vulnerability associated with divorce (183). The 
prescribed alimony and child support should be enough to ensure that both 
households enjoy the same standard of living, and should endure at least as long as 
the marriage did rather than only being considered temporary and rehabilitative (with 
the underlying assumption that the custodial parent receives an independent income) 
and thereafter the child support should ensure that the child has the same standard of 
living as the noncustodial parent.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 45	
Okin also suggests that the workplace and schools would need to be reformed. 
Firstly, the state must provide high-quality subsidised daycare, and large employers 
should provide on-site daycare (176-177). Secondly, workplaces will need to assume 
that many employees have responsibilities to care for children or elderly relatives and 
make provision for this. There must be parental leave for both parents, and both 
parents must be able to work part-time or flexible hours until their child is of school 
age. Thirdly, schools need to provide high quality after-school care so that they do not 
operate on the assumption that there is always a parent at home in the afternoons 
(177).  
Okin argues that these policy changes will help to equalise power relationships 
between men and women, and ensure that the exit costs are more or less the same for 
partners in relationships. Okin also believes that these policy changes will ensure that 
women and men are equally represented on every level of work and politics, and thus 
the benefits of a more equal private sphere will significantly benefit public gender 
equality (184). Further, children would benefit as well: since custodial parents are 
more likely to be below the poverty line, so are their children. If child support sustains 
the standard of living of children, children would be far less vulnerable because of the 
poverty that results from divorce. Secondly, Okin believes that the upbringing of 
children would be less gendered if they have equal input from both their fathers and 
mothers, if gender roles are less strictly adhered to, and if power imbalances are 
somewhat rectified. Finally, this kind of family would be a far more effective school 
of justice than a traditional family. A non-gendered family would better demonstrate 
fairness and respect, and empathy would be a more universal value rather than just a 
female one, since doing nurturing would make men more empathetic, and male 
parents being as present as their female partners will extend the development of the 
characteristics of empathy and a sense of connectedness that girls experience to boys. 
Boys and girls would then have the opportunity to become equally good at and 
interested in both ‘feminine’ nurturing and ‘masculine’ ambition and self-esteem.   
Okin makes use of Robert E. Goodin’s work on vulnerability to make an 
argument justifying regulation of marriage on the grounds that it is a particular site of 
vulnerability. According to Goodin, over and above the usual obligations owed to 
individuals, ‘we bear special responsibilities for protecting those who are particularly 
vulnerable to us’ (quoted in Okin, 136). There is also a moral obligation to minimise 
vulnerability when it is an alterable social artifact because a state of vulnerability 
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opens people up to exploitation. In order to test for whether or not unacceptable, 
asymmetric vulnerability exists, Okin proposes we apply the test developed by Albert 
O Hirschman to determine the asymmetry of the relationship by comparing the 
relative exit strategies of those in relationship: if it is significantly easier for one 
partner to exit a relationship than another, which thereby gives the former partner 
significantly more power in a relationship, where the asymmetry is the result of social 
arrangement, then there exists unacceptable asymmetric distribution of responsibility 
between them (137). From all the preceding arguments, it should be clear that there is 
certainly gendered asymmetric vulnerability in heterosexual couples, and this 
structural reality acts to make it significantly more difficult to leave a relationship as a 
woman, particularly in the event of housewives. Therefore, even though housewives 
are often arguably less exploited, they are worse off in terms of their capacity to leave 
a relationship, and therefore in terms of the corresponding vulnerability. 
2.2.3. OKIN AND LIBERALISM 
 
Okin clearly believes that a consistent application of liberalism entails ‘interference’ 
into the marriage realm. However, this is a controversial statement, given that 
liberalism is in large part dependent on interfering as little as possible, especially into 
the private realm (Abbey, 2011:52). As such, Okin could be criticised for 
insufficiently respecting privacy and protecting individual freedoms. Ruth Abbey lists 
two potential responses Okin could have to this charge that her interference into 
privacy is inconsistent with her liberalism (52). Firstly, she could rely on criticisms 
that feminists have frequently made against the private-public divide, where this 
divide is merely a strategy for maintaining the status quo, where a refusal to allow the 
state to regulate the household differently is ‘tantamount to supporting its most 
powerful members, and thus a violation of the liberal respect for equal personhood’ 
(Okin quoted in Abbey, 2011:52). Secondly, she could argue that the liberal value of 
privacy and individual freedom has traditionally only been awarded to the heads of 
households and has explicitly served ‘to shield family dynamics from scrutiny’ (53). 
In order that the family is not permanently excluded by default from the realm of 
justice, Okin can advocate individual privacy, where the family unit (and the 
attendant relationships between individuals) is not protected from the type of scrutiny 
which intends to secure universal individual freedom and privacy. 
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However, the criticism that Okin’s position is importantly inconsistent with 
liberalism is more serious when one looks at what Abbey considers the most 
controversial part of Okin’s theory: that the ultimate goal of the regulation of 
marriage is to do away with gender altogether (Abbey, 2011:54). This is read into her 
theory from the following hints: firstly, Okin believes that gender structured marriage 
must be allowed because this is currently what some people prefer, but it must be 
phased out, and secondly, it will in fact be phased out when these policy changes 
make an equal division of labour more plausible, and when the bringing up of 
children does not result in such strict gender roles and gendered expectations. This is 
partly because of Okin’s non-specified use of gender, but it should be clear from the 
above that the kind of gender Okin means is the ways in which people are treated 
(unjustifiably) differently as a result of their gender. Amy Baehr draws a distinction 
between two kinds of uses of the word ‘gender’ used by Okin, where the first means 
‘the institutionalization of sexual difference such that benefits and burdens are 
distributed according to sex’ and secondly, the ‘psychosexual component of identity’ 
(Baehr, 1996:54-55). If Okin was prescribing changing the second, this may well 
seem like an unreasonable (and anti-liberal) interference in individual lives. 
This resonates with a critique by Robert Card (2001), who believes that Okin’s 
theory necessitates not only a prescribed change in division of paid and unpaid work 
in marriages, but also a concomitant change in attitudes (164). His argument is as 
follows: since Okin relies on Goodin and the extra obligation that arises in cases of 
vulnerability, any division of labour which causes vulnerability must be prohibited. 
This is because the major asset that is the consequence of such distribution is itself not 
distributable: human capital (i.e. earning power). Card argues that the partner who 
makes sacrifices in her earning power will always have less earning power, which 
will always be a source of vulnerability for them, and as such no one must be 
permitted to make such sacrifices: rather, partners must take on exactly the same 
proportions of paid and unpaid work to mitigate this effect on earning power. In other 
words, the only equitable distribution of paid and unpaid work in a relationship is 
exactly equal. Not only does this completely override any preferences partners may 
have on how to run their home and to do domestic work rather than paid work, Card 
also believes that it necessitates a change in attitudes, where the change in gender 
roles must be accompanied by egalitarian beliefs (in other words, about the abolition 
of gender roles) (167).  
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I argue that this is a misreading of vulnerability. Firstly, Okin’s policy 
recommendations do mitigate the vulnerability created even by the disparity in 
earning power: since the standards of living must be the same in both households, 
even if the female partner earns less, she must receive enough money to ensure that 
her standard of living does not suffer as a result. Secondly, I believe Card attributes 
too much vulnerability to the relative discrepancy in earning power and not enough to 
the surrounding social conditions which make this into a problem. If the gender roles 
were reversed, and it is the man that has made more sacrifices in his career in order to 
take on domestic duties, what would happen to him if he divorced his higher-earning 
spouse? Firstly, given the current statistics on custody, it is still likely that his wife 
will be the custodial parent, therefore his household will be smaller and cheaper to 
maintain. Additionally, he would have far more time to devote to his career than his 
custodial ex-partner. Secondly, due to the pay gap, he would earn significantly more 
than a woman in his position. Thirdly, due to gendered expectations, it is more likely 
that he will have a solid career to fall back on with opportunities of advancement, 
unlike his female counterpart, who would be more likely to return to a dead-end job. 
If there is a still a discrepancy between his standard of living and his ex-wife’s, 
Okin’s policy recommendation are designed to counteract this by prescribing that his 
and his ex-wife’s standard of living must be the same.  
As such, I believe that the extra step that Card takes in prescribing a highly 
specified form of family life is unnecessary. The policy recommendations that Okin 
makes are designed to protect the vulnerable even if their preferences are detrimental 
to them, which means that her theory actually protects preferences rather than 
interfering with them. This counters the objection that she interferes too much in 
people’s private lives. Okin believes that once society is more egalitarian in terms of 
gender, these preferences may well fall away and gender will become less and less 
significant in dictating people’s choices as well as their respective life chances and 
vulnerabilities. Additionally, it is clear that Okin dislikes gender-structured marriage, 
but explicitly states that it must be allowed to continue given that it is some people’s 
preference (1989:180). She thus explicitly protects preference against interference, 
but ensures that vulnerability is not allowed to continue under the guise of the 
protection of the private sphere. 
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2.2.4 APPLYING OKIN’S THEORY TO NURTURING WORK 
 
 Okin presents a convincing argument that, firstly, due to the vulnerability 
brought about by marriage, intervention is justified, and secondly, that such 
intervention would successfully mitigate such vulnerability. Yet intervention into the 
division of nurturing work could not be justified by vulnerability. This is because it is 
not clear that doing more nurturing work makes one more vulnerable – in fact, there is 
an argument to be made that doing more of it makes one less vulnerable. We saw in 
the first chapter that the fact that men do less nurturing work in their married lives 
renders them very vulnerable if they are widowed or separated in older age, since they 
tend to suffer from severe social isolation, with corresponding health and mental 
health problems. If we were to apply Okin’s strategy, where people are not made 
vulnerable regardless of their preferences, then steps would need to be taken in order 
to ensure that widowed or single elderly men are not isolated – for instance, better 
assisted care with an eye to addressing social deficits, not merely to addressing 
physical needs.  
However, since I believe it is unfair that women do the vast majority of 
nurturing work, this would not solve the problem: the reason men are so vulnerable 
upon the loss of their wives is because they depended on them so heavily throughout 
their lives without learning to reciprocate or to take care of themselves. Men therefore 
benefit throughout their lives from the distributive arrangement of nurturing work, yet 
this is precisely what makes them vulnerable in old age. Even if the vulnerability of 
elderly men is addressed through external supports, the unfair arrangement during 
marriage is not affected at all. In fact, protecting the vulnerability of elderly men 
could be seen as facilitating the status quo – which is not to say that the vulnerability 
should not be mitigated, but doing so will be entirely ineffectual in bringing about a 
fairer distribution of nurturing work.  
Even if Okin’s policy recommendations are successful, they will not have a 
direct effect on the distribution of nurturing work. Okin imagines that the 
implementation of her policies will have far-reaching consequences on the 
conceptions of gender: she relies on Nancy Chodorow’s psychoanalytic work that 
suggests that gendered identities are largely the consequences of having exclusively 
female caregivers. She suggests that if men are more active parents, they will cultivate 
empathetic natures, and in modeling this for boys, boys are likely to become more 
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empathetic as well. These are shaky grounds on which to base the solution to the 
problem of unequally distributed nurturing work: Chodorow’s theory, which 
attributes so much to having female caregivers, is not in the least uncontroversial. 
Further, a consequence of Chodorow’s work is that, for example, lesbian parents (who 
distribute nurturing work much more equally) would produce more ‘gendered’ boys 
than their egalitarian heterosexual counterparts. There is no evidence of this. 
Finally, if it is the case that the distribution of nurturing work is unfair to 
women, then a more urgent intervention is required that is not premised on the 
dubious possibility of the disappearance of gender altogether after generations of 
changed policy. To phrase it differently, women should have a way of accessing more 
nurturing without this being premised on the disappearance of the patriarchy or 
gender altogether. A woman who is in a relationship with an unfair distribution of 
nurturing work must have recourse for her particular problem, rather than merely 
hoping that her future granddaughter does not have a similar problem with her spouse. 
In other words, it must be possible to claim that the relationship ought to be different, 
or seek a remedy for its unfairness even while someone is socialised according to his 
or her gender. Children ought not to be socialised into these harmful gender roles, and 
adults ought not have to persist in unfair relationships because their partners were 
socialised as such in their youth.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter looked at two contractualist solutions to the problem of the division of 
household labour and nurturing work. Hampton makes use of a contractualist test that 
can be employed by an individual to test her relationship for the presence of 
exploitation. This test may serve some psychological function in encouraging women 
to cast a self-interested eye over their relationships, but its use is ultimately limited 
because of the exclusion of benefits and costs that are the side-effects of affective or 
duty-based ties: as Sample points out, any sacrifice that one makes for one’s family is 
only explicable in terms of those criteria. Further, since much of nurturing work is 
intimately tied up to love and duty, their  exclusion  means that this cannot test for the 
fairness of the distribution of nurturing work. Its benefit is mainly that it presents a 
philosophically justified inclusion of self-interest, which could work to counteract the 
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social pressures women feel to be unreasonably self-sacrificing, but it also does not 
function as a guide for what could constitute being unreasonably self-sacrificing.  
Okin, on the other hand, makes use of the Rawlsian social contract to imagine 
a just society that includes a just family. She justifies the seemingly illiberal proposal 
to regulate family life with the principle that socially constructed vulnerability should 
be minimised where possible. Her policy-proposals may well be effective in changing 
the division of housework and thereby the participation of women in the public 
sphere. Nevertheless, it is unlikely to change the division of nurturing work except 
insofar as it is likely to change gender altogether by minimising gender roles and 
gendered expectations.  
Further, her arguments relating to vulnerability are unlikely to be helpful to 
the unfair situation women find themselves in in doing more nurturing work, since it 
is the vulnerability of men that will need to be mitigated.  It may be the case that a 
woman’s emotional well-being is less than her husband’s if she does all the nurturing 
work, but that need not mean that she is vulnerable, since vulnerability does not 
simply mean non-optimal conditions, but rather being unreasonably exposed to the 
threat of harm. The vulnerability of elderly men entails their increased risk of 
depression, extreme loneliness, illness, and premature death, which means that they 
are clearly exposed to more risk of harm. The same cannot be said of a woman whose 
emotional wellbeing is not optimal. Therefore, with respect to nurturing work, Okin’s 
work is likely to be more beneficial to men than women. Given that I have endorsed 
her arguments relating to vulnerability, I must also endorse the consequence that the 
vulnerability of single elderly men ought to be mitigated. Despite this, the unfairness 
of the distribution of nurturing work cannot be addressed with this theory. 
These theories cannot tell us why the distribution of nurturing work is unjust: I 
have shown that it may well maximise utility for a woman to opt into a gender-
structured relationship, and can thereby not be avoided by taking rational self-interest 
into account. Further, since this distribution does not render women vulnerable, it is 
not clear from Okin’s work that this distribution of nurturing work is an injustice to 
women. Nevertheless, it is the case that the bulk of nurturing work is more or less 
automatically allocated according to gender, and so it cannot be merely a case of 
some relationships being unfair, but rather a way in which women do more unpaid, 
unrecognised work. As such, I will move onto another candidate for an account of 
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why this distribution of labour could be considered wrongful: an account of 
exploitation from materialist feminism.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 53	
CHAPTER THREE: EXPLOITATION OF NURTURING WORK 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The next candidate for the wrongfulness of an unequal division of nurturing 
work is exploitation. Intuitively, this seems like a useful line of enquiry for the 
following reasons: 1) we are looking at a kind of work that is not compensated at all, 
either through reciprocation or through payment; 2) one group of people (those not 
doing the work) benefit more from this work that is uncompensated (even though it 
may be considered mutually beneficial), and 3) it seems that this arrangement is in 
some sense unfair. The standard definition for exploitation is when one party takes 
unfair advantage of another party at the expense of the latter party, so it seems at its 
face that this could potentially be a form of exploitation.  It is also possible to draw an 
analogy with a clear case of exploitation, which I take from Ruth Sample’s list of 
examples:  
 
A factory owner visits a village in a Pacific Rim country and offers to set 
up a running shoe factory that would pay each worker $2 per day. The 
current average daily wage in the village is $1, which is enough to prevent 
a worker and his family from starving. The workers will have no benefits 
other than salary and must work eighty hours per week. The workers 
accept. The running shoes sell for $95 per pair in the United States and 
Western Europe, and half of that price is corporate profit.  
(2003:8) 
 
The similarities between this scenario and that of the unequal division of 
nurturing work are as follows: firstly, it is a mutually beneficial arrangement, where 
the exploited party maximises their utility by entering into it. We saw in the previous 
chapter that where a woman wants a family, she is maximising utility by having a 
family, even if she does far more unpaid work than her partner. Secondly, the 
arrangement is nevertheless unfair, because the exploited party is not receiving her 
due for the work done. Where the worker in the sweatshop gets paid far too little, 
employed women in relationships who work do not get compensated at all, either 
through payment nor through being nurtured in turn. Thirdly, the asymmetry in 
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choices available to the parties causes a power imbalance upon entering into the 
contract. The sweatshop worker can choose to work for less, but is not able to choose 
to work for a company that will employ her on fair terms. A man whose wife leaves 
him because he does too little nurturing work will easily find another woman willing 
to do that work, whereas a woman is unlikely to find a man who will do an equal 
share of the nurturing work. He is therefore spoiled for choice for people who will opt 
in to the agreement on terms that are advantageous to him, whereas she will have 
trouble finding a man agreeing to such terms at all. Finally, the only route the 
exploited party has to a certain good is through being exploited: the sweatshop worker 
can only earn $2 a day by working on unfair terms, and a heterosexual woman can 
only have a two-parent family if she is exploited. Of course, this is all in very general 
terms, and it is certainly possible that one out of a hundred workers is employed by 
someone else on better terms, and that one out of a hundred women finds a man who 
does half the nurturing work. These exceptions are not enough to render this argument 
irrelevant.  
This chapter will look at materialist feminist accounts of how women are 
exploited by capitalism. In order to do this, an analysis of the mode of production 
women are engaged in in the family will be provided. This will bolster the materialist 
feminist point that it is not only the proletariat that is exploited by a capitalist system, 
but also women insofar as they engage in unpaid work in the home.  Secondly, I will 
look at the work by sociologist Arlie Hochschild about emotional labour in the 
workplace and its resultant alienation, and attempt to see what parallels can be drawn 
between the pitfalls of emotion work in the workplace and those in the home. Thirdly, 
I will look briefly at three additional accounts of exploitation and attempt to assess if 
they can explain the wrongfulness of an unequal division of nurturing work. Fourthly, 
I will look at an argument that situates the wrongfulness of an unequal division of 
nurturing work in the fact that it contributes to the oppression of women. 
 
3.1. ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION OF EMOTION WORK 
3.1.1. A MATERIALIST FEMINIST ACCOUNT 
 
Marx’s traditional account of exploitation is based on the industrial mode of 
production which trades in exchange value. I will briefly outline the traditional 
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account and then explain how materialist feminists extend this analysis to the home. 
Marx’s account is that of the relationship between the worker and the capitalist, who 
owns the means of production. Workers do not own the means of production, and so 
are forced to sell their labour power in order to survive (Colley, 2015:223). Workers 
believe they are selling their labour, which means that they think there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between the work done and the pay received, and so are fairly 
compensated for their labour. However, this belief forms part of capitalist ideology 
that functions to prevent workers from realising that they are being exploited. In fact, 
workers sell their labour power, which allows the capitalist to extract as much labour 
as possible from the worker with the same amount of pay (224). The worker thinks he 
is being paid per hour of work, and that this is a fixed unit of work, but the capitalist 
tries to extract as much labour as possible from this hour of paid work. The wages that 
workers receive, rather than being determined by the proportion of the value of the 
object, is determined in ‘the relation to the costs of ensuring that the labourers can 
socially reproduce themselves and continually supply labour power’ (224). In reality, 
their work is worth much more than they are paid, and the proportion of their labour 
which they are not paid for is known as ‘surplus value’ and is appropriated by the 
capitalist and called ‘profit’. This value is extracted from the gap between the pay that 
the labourer’s family needs to survive and the real value of the product or commodity 
produced.   
Marx explains how labour power reproduces itself: workers sell their labour 
power, and then they use the money earned to sustain their lives, and as such, 
reproduces labour power. However, the worker still has amassed no capital, and so 
must work again in order to eat and survive (Himmelweit, 1991:200). However, 
according to Himmelweit, Marx did not give any account of how workers are 
reproduced, where one generation of workers is replaced by the next (202), and as 
such makes the proletariat and the capitalist ‘appear as immortal and therefore not in 
need of reproduction themselves’ (202). This oversight is particularly relevant for the 
working class, since the capitalist class need not consist of any great number, and in 
fact how many people occupy this class does not affect the functioning of the 
economic system. However, the proletariat and the labour power they sell consist of 
living bodies, and their role ‘depends on their physical reproduction as human beings’ 
(210).  
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Feminists have attempted to address this lacuna in Marx by extending the 
analysis of labour relations to the family. One such feminist is Christine Delphy, who, 
in her book, Close to Home (1984), distinguishes between the ‘industrial mode of 
production’ and the ‘family mode of production’. The key difference usually asserted 
between the labour in the industrial mode of production versus the labour in the 
family mode of production is that whereas the industrial mode of production produces 
value that is sold for consumption by others – which is known as exchange value –in 
the family mode of production, the value produced is consumed within the family 
without being sold, which is known as use value. Exchange value is usually 
considered productive labour and use value is typically considered reproductive 
labour.  
However, this very distinction reveals a masculinist bias in the way that labour 
is theorised (Colley, 2015:231). Separating labour into ‘productive’ and 
‘reproductive’ is a way of placing men’s work above women’s work in a hierarchy, 
and is thereby ‘ideologically entangled with capitalism’s undervaluing of women’s 
work’. Colley argues that capitalism works to obscure women’s work by making it 
seem that the industrial mode of production is a relation between the worker and his 
employer, when in actual fact it is a three-way relationship between the female doing 
nurturing work, her husband working for a wage, and the capitalist paying a wage, 
where the male worker only acts as a middleman between the woman doing 
‘reproductive labour’ (in other words, creating labour power), and the capitalist 
appropriating that labour power by underpaying the employee (231). Materialist 
feminists therefore argue that capitalism produces an ideology that makes it appear 
that women’s work is a matter of ‘natural’ proclivity, of personal relationships, of 
use-value (self-consumption), and thereby as non-work, whereas it is actually integral 
to capitalism’s functioning and the industrial mode of production, and insofar as 
Marxian theories of labour exclude women’s work, it is complicit in capitalism’s 
ideological undervaluing of women’s work’ (231).  
Delphy argues that the distinction between use-value and exchange value is 
not at all clear-cut. Family work is traditionally considered use-value rather than 
exchange-value because it is consumed by the family rather than exchanged for 
money. However, Delphy points out that an agricultural family challenges this strict 
distinction: in agricultural homes, women are often responsible for things that can 
both be consumed by the family and sold in the market, such as being in charge of the 
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hens and the milking. The family both consumes and sells eggs and milk, which itself 
challenges the notion that use-value (in other words, what is intended for 
consumption), and exchange-value, are distinct (61-62). If we were to look beyond 
the agricultural family and look at the family that earns money, the kinds of domestic 
services performed by women can similarly be both consumed by the family, and sold 
on a market, and when women do this work outside of the family, they are paid as 
wage-labourers, for instance as cleaners or child-minders. Domestic services are thus 
clearly not the kind of services that produce only use-value intended for self-
consumption. Delphy suggests that for these reasons, a woman’s labour power is 
appropriated by her husband in the home, which is to say that it is (and its fruits are) 
unfairly taken possession of by her husband: ‘in family production, she does not make 
use of her labour power; her husband makes use of it’. Insofar as the domestic 
services a woman provides sustain life that earns money on the market, her husband 
trades what she provides for money that he receives for his work (67). 
The modes of production the husband participates in are distinct from the 
modes of production his wife participates in (in her unpaid labour). The industrial 
mode of production is characterised by the following: the services provided by the 
worker are fixed in nature and quantity, as is the value attached to those services (70). 
In contrast, a woman who works in the family mode of production performs services 
which are not fixed in their nature, nor is any fixed value accorded to them. Rather, 
both the content of the services and the value thereof depend on the inclinations, 
needs, and wealth of her husband. The wife of a wealthy man can earn significantly 
more for the same services than the wife of a poor man, since what qualifies as 
maintenance for the wife will depend on her husband’s standard of living. Further, the 
industrial mode of production is characterised by the fact the individuals participating 
are theoretically interchangeable, so the employee can be replaced and the worker is 
free to offer his services to a different employer. Workers are typically also able to 
improve their standard of living by working harder or providing higher quality work. 
In the family mode of production, on the other hand, the family relationship is highly 
individualised, and so wives are not able to offer their services to a new ‘employer’. 
They further cannot improve their standard of living by working more and improving 
their services, since their standard of living is entirely dependent on that of her 
husband (70). 
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The housewife, or the wife insofar as she performs domestic services, thus 
falls outside of the proletariat/capitalist class system, since she does not actually 
belong to the same class as her husband. Her husband owns the means of production 
and appropriates her labour power. Delphy suggests that this economic relationship 
most closely resembles serfdom, which is to say that it is labour power exchanged for 
maintenance, and wives constitute their own class distinct from their husband. 
Because women are destined from birth to become a part of this class (since nearly all 
women marry), women constitute a caste (71). This analysis is a technical one rather 
than normative, but it is trivial to state that the existence of a caste (where one is 
destined to be disadvantaged because of an arbitrary and unchangeable factor) is a 
matter of injustice. Further, since women’s labour power is appropriated and they do 
not own the means of production, they are exploited. 
I have until now maintained that housewives are less exploited than working 
wives because they at least receive some financial compensation for their housework, 
whereas working wives do the work without that benefit. However, this current 
economic analysis calls that view into question: since neither the housewife’s services 
nor their value are fixed, it is not at all clear that she is being paid for that work. 
Rather, she works in exchange for her keep, and the standard of living she receives is 
entirely dependent on her husband’s class status instead of her own work. This is also 
true of working wives, except she has an income insofar as she is active in the 
industrial mode of production, but she is not guaranteed maintenance. In fact, Delphy 
states that the costs of maintaining the home and children typically comes from the 
wife’s salary, so she pays for the maintenance of herself and her children, and 
possibly part of the maintenance of her husband. This means, argues Delphy, that it is 
‘as though she never earned the money in the first place’ (69).  
This economic account of exploitation shows that it is not only the proletariat 
that is exploited, but also the women who reproduce the proletariat. Capitalism 
exploits women in a particular way, and so the gendered oppression of women in 
heterosexual relations is intimately tied up with capitalism. Insofar as women perform 
more unpaid labour in the home, they are exploited in this way, and since emotion 
work constitutes a part of such reproductive labour, it is exploited. This, however, 
chiefly serves as a feminist critique of capitalism, rather than a critique of the way 
people structure their family lives. However, the critique that workers are alienated 
from their labour is a normative claim about how the labour relation is bad. I will thus 
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pursue how emotional labour in the workplace can lead to alienation, using 
Hochschild, and then attempt to extend this analysis to the home. 
 
3.1.2 ALIENATION OF EMOTIONAL LABOUR 
 
We saw in the first chapter that Arlie Hochschild offers a new account of 
emotions which does not describe emotions as a spontaneous, uncontrollable response 
to events, but rather is the product of complex rules and effort. We frequently attempt 
to manage our emotions in such a way that they obey ‘feeling rules’. We also do 
emotion work on others, where beyond the work we do on our own emotions, we 
target the emotions of others. The ways in which we do this on ourselves and on 
others in our private lives in order to improve the emotional or mental states of others, 
or the wellbeing of the group, is known as ‘emotion work’. In her book, The Managed 
Heart (2003b), Hochschild is interested in the way in which this private phenomenon 
has been utilised in the realm of business, where it becomes a use-value that generates 
profit. She refers to this phenomenon as the ‘transmutation of an emotional system’, 
and she refers to the emotion work that occurs in the workplace as ‘emotional labour’ 
(19). 
Hochschild’s book is chiefly an empirical study of flight attendants as an 
example of performing emotional labour. Specifically, she looks at what happens in 
the case of a ‘speed-up’, where planes become larger but crews of flight attendants 
become smaller, which means that every individual flight attendant has more 
passengers to attend to (122). In this case, it becomes impossible to invest emotional 
labour with the sincerity that comes with ‘deep acting’, which involves generating the 
appropriate emotions, as opposed to ‘surface acting’, which is merely pretending to be 
feeling the appropriate emotions. The flight attendant is therefore unable to generate 
genuine friendliness and concern for the passengers’ wellbeing. In some cases, the 
performance of emotional labour simply becomes impossible – for instance, a woman 
explained how she avoids eye contact because passengers typically use eye contact to 
make a request, and she has no time to attend to requests (122), and so she avoids eye 
contact altogether. As such, these flight attendants, ‘when asked to make personal 
human contact at an inhuman speed, they cut back on their emotion work and grew 
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detached’ (126). This is known as ‘going robot’, where the flight attendants adopt 
surface acting rather than deep acting. 
The impossibility of engaging in deep acting has three potential effects: the 
first is burnout (where the worker finds herself cut off from her emotions in the form 
of ‘emotional numbness’); the second is a feeling of inauthenticity; and the third is 
cynical acting (where the worker becomes estranged from the acting itself) (188). The 
speed-up need not be understood in terms of surplus value, but can still take a 
contribution from Marx in that the speed-up and its concomitant problems are clearly 
the result of conflicting interests between employer and employee: the employee 
desires to take pride in her work which she does well, which means that she needs to 
be able to engage in deep acting rather than surface acting, which she is only able to 
do if she has enough time and enough resources. Conversely, the employer needs her 
to ‘process’ as many people as time allows, not as emotional resources allow. This 
conflict caused by exploitation results in harm that the employee suffers, and this 
harm occurs chiefly in her sense of authenticity. 
In his paper, ‘The Alienated Heart’ (2009), Paul Brook examines what he calls 
‘Hochschild’s half-made theory of alienation’ (14). He dubs it thus because 
Hochschild only gives an account of two of the four elements of alienation as 
identified by Marx: she gives an account of product alienation and process alienation, 
but not of alienation from fellow beings and alienation from human nature (9). Flight 
attendants are alienated from the product of their labour because the product of their 
emotional labour belongs to the company (which is sold to the consumer) rather than 
to them. Their friendliness, their smiles, and their solicitousness are all seen to belong 
to the airline, and are part of the product that the customer pays for, instead of 
belonging to the individual flight attendant. The consequence of this is emotive 
dissonance as described above, where the flight attendant experiences burnout, 
cynicism, or inauthenticity. According to Brook, emotive dissonance is ‘a more 
profound form of alienation than even Marx imagined’ (16). A flight attendant is 
alienated from the labour process because, in the ‘speed-up’, her work is de-skilled by 
the codification of her work (17). This occurs in the form of strict rules flight 
attendants must follow, such as being given a script when greeting passengers or 
offering them beverages, which means that she cannot use her own initiative to use 
her emotional labour effectively. Freedom, discretion, and personal creativity are thus 
all stifled in the process, again working against deep acting.  Brook argues that though 
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these are the only two kinds of alienation Hochschild looks at explicitly, she ‘leaves 
open the theoretical door’ to the examination of other kinds of alienation that occur in 
the commodification of emotional labour (21). This will be not be expanded upon 
here, since it is chiefly of interest whether or not Hochschild’s analysis could 
plausibly be translated to emotion work in the domestic space, and whether these two 
kinds of alienation Brook identifies occur in the family. 
The question is now whether or not the emotion work done at home is of the 
kind of nature that it can be exploited, and therefore if it can lead to alienation. In 
order to do this, we need to point out the relevant similarities and differences between 
emotion work and emotional labour, that is, the unpaid variety in the intimate context 
of the family, and the commercialised version that occurs in the workplace. These are 
similar in that they are both subject to ‘feeling rules’, though one might be literally 
formalised (in the form of scripts and the like) while the other remains informal, and 
they both preferably require ‘deep acting’ rather than surface acting, where one does 
not simply pretend that one is feeling feelings, but rather attempts to actually feel 
them. In both cases, successful emotion work/labour must be performed in such a way 
that the effort involved must be as invisible as possible – in other words, it must seem 
as sincere as possible.  
The most important difference that needs to be pointed out is that, whereas, for 
example, the flight attendant is wearing the smile that represents her company, a 
woman in the family context wears simply her own smile. In other words, the goals 
she seeks to achieve are her own rather than that of a company. Further, the process is 
not codified at all. A woman in the private sphere may typically freely and 
authentically choose how to do emotion work. A second salient difference is that the 
workplace is subject to a ‘speed-up’, where a worker’s working conditions can be 
changed in such a way that it becomes impossible to do her emotional labour with the 
sincerity that comes with ‘deep acting’, whereas in the home this is unlikely, as 
discussed below. However, it is worth complicating these differences somewhat, 
starting with the latter.   
The example of speed-up Hochschild uses occurs among flight attendants, 
where a flight attendant has to engage with 155 people in 40 minutes. It is of course 
nearly impossible that a woman would face this kind of pressure in her intimate 
relationships. However, if she is the kind of woman who has a full-time job, small 
children, and takes on the second shift, her resources may well be taxed to the point 
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where she is not able to invest the required deep acting into her emotion work. If she 
finds it important to keep doing emotion work regardless of her inability to achieve 
sincerity in doing so, it seems possible that she may show one of the three expressions 
of alienation Hochschild identifies: burnout, feeling ‘phoney’, or becoming cynical in 
her ‘acting’.  
Therefore, even if the ‘product’ of her work is part of her own goals and 
desires (rather than belonging to a company), and even if she is almost entirely in 
control of how she chooses to go about doing this work, it is nevertheless possible 
that she bears a cost in terms of her sense of authenticity. It is not implausible that 
some women would end up in this situation, particularly those who feel the 
expectation to achieve ‘supermom’ status. Nevertheless, it is also possible, and 
perhaps somewhat more likely, that a woman might simply opt out of doing this 
emotion work in the home, where she refuses the pressure to put work into 
conversational cheerleading, to feeding egos, and tending wounds. This possibility to 
opt out, where a woman might choose to maintain her authenticity instead of risking 
insincerity, is a significant difference between emotional labour and emotion work. 
This is not to say that there is no cost: the harmony of the family and the happiness of 
the family members, as well as the health of the relationships, will certainly suffer 
from the absence of such work. Given that women are socialised into associating the 
successful performance of emotion work with their identities, opting out of this work 
may also have consequences for her self-esteem and happiness. Nevertheless, these 
(unattractive) options are still available.  
Therefore, in some situations, there is sometimes harm attached to women 
being expected to do the bulk of emotion work, and that cost is alienation from the 
self. From a utilitarian perspective, there is perhaps a reason to think that this is why 
the unequal distribution of labour is wrong. However, it is certainly only in some 
circumstances that this particular harm occurs – it is only when a woman is entirely 
overburdened, which may well be only for the years when her children are young. 
This would mean that, once her children are older and her workload decreases 
slightly, it would be acceptable for her to still do the bulk of emotion work in her 
household, but this is clearly still wrongful even if it no longer impacts her 
authenticity or leads to burnout. This argument, which ultimately rests on a utilitarian 
account, can therefore not explain what is wrong about the unequal distribution of 
nurturing work in the home. 
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There is a further reason for thinking that the harm of the distribution of 
labour is not sufficient to show the wrongness of exploitation in this case, which can 
be found in Ruth Sample’s critique of Jean Hampton in Chapter 2.1. To recount it 
briefly, Sample analyses the decision of a woman to stay in a relationship from a 
rationally self-interested perspective. She concludes that if a woman wants a family 
and children, it is likely that she maximises her utility by doing so, even if she does so 
under unfair conditions. Therefore, even if women experience harm by doing more 
emotional work, they are voluntarily present in a relationship and can choose the 
alternative. The benefits thus outweigh the harm, and utilitarianism cannot explain 
why the distribution of labour is wrong. We thus need to draw on a notion of 
exploitation that tries to determine what is unfair about someone doing more work 
than they are compensated for.  
 
3.2. ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF EXPLOITATION 
 
In her book, Exploitation and Why it’s Wrong (2003), Ruth Sample looks at 
two alternative accounts of exploitation in order to formulate a new definition of 
exploitation that avoids the pitfalls of these two. These alternative definitions of 
exploitation also produce different answers to the question of why exploitation is 
wrong. I will briefly explain each, and assess whether the unequal division of 
nurturing work qualifies as exploitation under that definition, and if it can explain its 
wrongfulness. 
 
3.2.1. WERTHEIMER’S ‘MARKET PRICE’ EXPLOITATION 
 
Sample explains that Alan Wertheimer’s account of exploitation is ultimately 
outcomes-based rather than focused on procedural unfairness (Sample, 2003:16). His 
account is a conventionalist one, which is to say that his definition of exploitation 
depends on whether or not an existing convention is observed. The convention he 
utilises is market price: if someone is paid less than a hypothetical market price (in 
other words, the price that is determined by the supply and demand of the market), 
then they are being exploited, and if someone is paying less than market value, they 
are exploiting someone (19). However, Wertheimer acknowledges that exploitation 
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does not only occur in business relationships, but also in intimate relationships, and 
here he invokes a ‘baseline of decency’ (23). But Sample argues that the ‘market 
price’ test actually does no theoretical work; rather, falling below the baseline of 
decency is always required for something to constitute exploitation. For example, 
some cases of exploitation are exploitation because the market price is too low: for 
instance, in the case where someone in a sweatshop is paid $1 for every shoe they 
produce which is then sold for $98, this is considered by many to be exploitative, 
particularly if that income is not enough to sustain a decent life. However, it is 
because of the excess of supply of workers and the comparatively low demand of the 
capitalist (in other words, there is one capitalist providing jobs and many workers 
competing for those jobs) that the market price for labour is so low. The reason why 
this is exploitative must then be because it falls below a baseline of decency.  
There is no account provided for how to determine a ‘baseline of decency’, so 
Sample concludes that this must also be determined by a hypothetical market price. 
For instance, if we have a husband and wife, and the wife makes more sacrifices in 
her career in order to take on more unpaid work for her family. As indicated earlier, 
the reason why this is so prevalent must be because of something akin to a 
hypothetical market price: there is a highly limited supply of gender-egalitarian men 
who are willing to make an equal amount of sacrifices in the workplace and do extra 
work at home. Conversely, there is a large supply of women who are willing to do 
this. We saw in the previous chapter that if a woman wants a partner and children, it 
would maximise her utility to participate in family life on exploitative terms rather 
than be single, childless, and not exploited. However, the maximum utility a man can 
achieve is higher than that of a woman: he need not choose between being exploited 
or childless; he can both avoid doing an unfair amount of work and have children. He 
can have a fulfilling, successful career as well as a family. The ‘market’ is thus unfair 
to begin with, where one group of people benefits from the status quo. Even though 
Wertheimer acknowledges that even mutually beneficial arrangements can be 
exploitative, he cannot account for the badness of exploitation where the status quo 
already exhibits an injustice. His theory of exploitation is therefore not useful in 
explaining the wrongfulness of an unequal distribution of nurturing work. 
 
3.2.2. GOODIN’S ACCOUNT OF EXPLOITING THE VULNERABLE 
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A further account of exploitation that Sample looks at is that of Robert E. 
Goodin, whose work on vulnerability Susan Moller Okin uses, which appeared in 
Chapter Two. In his chapter, ‘Exploiting a situation and exploiting a person’ (1987), 
Goodin defines exploitation as ‘taking unfair advantage of someone’, which is a 
moralised definition of exploitation, which means to say that x is a case of 
exploitation is to say that x is morally wrong. The wrongness of exploitation is thus in 
its very definition. 
He frames ‘unfairness’ in terms of the analogy of games: ‘the rules of the 
game’, where ‘playing’ fairly means obeying the rules, and ‘playing’ unfairly means 
breaking the rules (1987:183). Different contexts and interactions have different rules 
of engagement (rules of the game), and deviations from this would depend on those 
rules of engagement. The rules of engagement are simply those that are stipulated by 
existing norms, which means that Goodin’s account is also a conventionalist account. 
It would thus be exploitative to gain an advantage over someone by violating the 
existing norms of the game. This is the first way of exploiting someone. The second 
way of exploiting someone is when one does play according to the rules of the game, 
but the party one is engaging with is vulnerable, which makes it inappropriate to play 
for advantage (184). Goodin lists four kinds of situations where the other party’s 
vulnerability makes it inappropriate to play for advantage: i) when the person one is 
playing against has herself renounced playing for advantage by, for example, acting 
based on trust; ii) when the player is unfit to play for advantage; iii) when players are 
no match for you in games of advantage; and iv) when your relative advantage 
derives from others’ grave misfortunes. In each of these cases, the party one is 
engaging with is vulnerable, and that vulnerability makes it wrong to play for 
advantage (185-186).  
Presumably, when Goodin says the ordinary rules of engagement ought to be 
suspended, he does not mean that behaviour that would normally be considered unfair 
would be allowed, but rather that the other person’s interests deserve especial 
consideration. This corresponds to Goodin’s argument in his book, Protecting the 
Vulnerable (1985), where he argues that we have a special obligation to protect the 
vulnerable. A minimum requirement of this is to refrain from exploiting the 
vulnerable, which means refraining from playing for advantage against them.  
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The first case of vulnerability, where the other person has renounced playing 
for advantage, seems promising, since intimate relationships are characterised by love 
and trust and are usually not expected to consist of two people attempting to extract 
maximum personal advantage from each other (or that this would be occurring 
unilaterally). However, since this is the case, it seems highly unlikely that the 
extremely prevalent unequal distribution of nurturing work between men and women 
is because men are playing for advantage against women who have renounced doing 
so.  Rather, the men in these relationships most likely see themselves as having 
renounced playing for advantage as well. I will return to this point in a moment after 
briefly dispensing with the other kinds of vulnerability. 
The second, where the other player is unfit to play for advantage, also would 
not apply in most cases. In fact, we saw in Sample’s critique of Okin in section 2.1.3. 
that individual women may well be maximising utility by entering into these 
relationships, even if the terms of such relationships do not provide equal utility to the 
male and female partners. A player would be unfit to play for advantage due to some 
attribute they have: perhaps they are unconscious, or too young, or not compos 
mentis. It is certainly not the case that most women are unable, in principle, to play 
for advantage. The third, when the player is no match for you in terms of advantage, 
seems to refer to massive power differentials – Goodin uses the example of someone 
having a monopoly on something that others need desperately. In this scenario, those 
with the desperate need do not have sufficient bargaining power because of their 
situation. This would also not apply to our scenario.  
The fourth case is where one’s relative advantage is the consequence of 
someone else’s grave misfortune. This one is interesting, because while it is the case 
that the relative privilege, status, and resources men possess are absolutely dependent 
on the oppression of women, it is still not clear that the social lot of women could be 
characterised as ‘grave misfortune’. In fact, it seems that in order for something to be 
considered a ‘grave misfortune’, it would need to render the party extremely 
vulnerable. I discussed the application of Goodin’s work in Protecting the Vulnerable 
to this phenomenon by Okin in section 2.2.3, and showed women are rarely, if ever, 
made vulnerable by the unequal distribution of nurturing work, and elderly, widowed 
men are made the most vulnerable. As such, this fourth scenario would also not apply.  
There is an element of Goodin’s theory aside from vulnerability which makes 
it difficult to apply to intimate relationships: formulating it as ‘playing for advantage’ 
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suggests deliberate activity, as consciously attempting to maximise one’s benefit from 
an interaction. This formulation of course makes sense with business interactions, 
where business negotiations are explicitly characterised as each party attempting to 
extract maximum advantage, but it makes less sense with personal relationships. 
Sample points out in her own account of exploitation that it occurs because men and 
women have gendered expectations of how much work they can expect their partner 
to do, and because they are correct in those expectations (2002:266-267). The fact that 
we have been conditioned into gendered expectations is the root of the exploitation, 
not the deliberate actions of men in relationships. This is not to say that there is no 
personal moral obligation to refrain from exploiting another in an intimate 
relationship, but it does mean that deliberately ‘playing for advantage’ is an incorrect 
way of characterising the phenomenon. 
If it is the case that women are not necessarily made vulnerable by the unequal 
distribution of nurturing work, then all that remains of Goodin’s theory to make an 
argument for exploitation is his standard formulation, which would be taking unfair 
advantage of another person, where unfairness refers to a violation of the social norms 
governing the interaction. This will also not work with this phenomenon because the 
norms governing heterosexual relationships are precisely the problem, and so the 
same problems as with Wertheimer’s theory of exploitation reemerge in Goodin’s. 
Given that women are taught to express love through doing nurturing work in a way 
that men are not, the very conception of romantic love between heterosexual partners 
currently expects women to do more nurturing work than their partners, whereas male 
partners are expected to contribute more financially. Relying on convention as a 
measure of fairness will never detect the unfairness that arises from an existing 
societal oppression. Until our very notion of romantic relationships, and what 
constitutes fair play in such relationships, encapsulates an idea of either an equal 
division of nurturing work, or at least that such work should not be distributed 
automatically on the basis of gender, a theory of exploitation relying on convention 
cannot be used to show that the distribution of nurturing work is exploitative.  
Interestingly, Goodin’s formulation could be used to show that an unequal 
distribution of nurturing work where the male partner does more nurturing work is 
exploitative, and this is precisely because it is an unconventional distribution of 
labour. Romantic relationships are regulated by norms that allow for women to do 
more nurturing work, but not for men, and insofar as a woman gains an advantage 
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from her male partner doing more emotion work, and insofar as that deviates from the 
norm of a romantic relationship, she exploits her partner. In other words, the case of 
Tom and Emma in the introduction could be declared wrongful because it deviates 
from gender roles. However, this only serves to highlight the problem of a 
conventional account of exploitation, since the wrongfulness of that arrangement is 
certainly not that it deviates from the usual sexist patterns. Therefore, Goodin’s theory 
of exploitation cannot show the wrongfulness of an unequal distribution of nurturing 
work in a romantic relationship that is such because of allocation based on gender or a 
gender atypical allocation. 
 
3.2.3. SAMPLE’S ‘EXPLOITATION AS DEGRADATION’ 
 
Ruth Sample puts forward an account of ‘exploitation as degradation’ 
(2003:56), where she posits that exploitation occurs when one degrades or disrespects 
someone in order to gain an advantage (57). Sample divides disrespect of persons into 
three categories: i) failing to provide what is necessary for someone’s flourishing, ii) 
taking advantage of an existing injustice, and iii) commodifying something about a 
person that ‘ought not be commodified’ (57). Some of the advantages of this view 
according to Sample are that degradation is already considered wrong, and so her 
account has a clear normative element (59). Secondly, it is possible to account for 
exploitation on both an individual and institutional level – unlike, for instance, 
Wertheimer’s view, this account does not rely on convention, which may already 
enshrine an injustice (60). A further advantage of this account is that one needn’t 
include intent or even awareness that exploitation is taking place: it is possible to 
exploit by degrading someone without intending to do so or without knowing that one 
is doing so. Further, it can be used to identify the presence of exploitation even in a 
mutually beneficial relationship. In other words, even where there is no net loss in 
utility from the perspective of the person being exploited, it still qualifies as 
exploitation.  
It now needs to be established whether or not this theory sufficiently accounts 
for the exploitation that ostensibly occurs in gendered nurturing work. In order to do 
so, it should be possible to show that, firstly, men in these relationships gain an 
advantage through unjust arrangements, and secondly, that women are degraded in 
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one of the three ways through this unequal (or unreciprocated) division of nurturing 
work. Firstly, this is not a case where someone is being deprived of something they 
need for their wellbeing or flourishing through neglect, and so the first kind of 
degradation is not at stake here. While it is true that women are deprived of care 
specifically from their partners, which may well be detrimental to the wellbeing of 
that relationship,  it is in principle possible for a woman to access care and intimacy 
elsewhere – perhaps from her female friends or family members. It is not the case that 
the man with whom a woman is in a relationship with has a monopoly on the goods 
that a woman needs to achieve wellbeing. It seems possible that a woman could be in 
an extremely unequal relationship with respect to nurturing work and nevertheless 
flourish because of being nurtured by her other relationships. This is not to say that 
one’s partner does not have some kind of monopoly (see Chapter 4), but if one’s 
partner withholds nurturing work, one still potentially has access to nurturing work 
from other people. 
Likewise, the third kind of degradation that takes the form of commodifying 
something that ought not be commodified is unlikely to be useful. It is not clear that 
emotion work ‘ought’ not be commodified. Perhaps it is the case that there are things 
in an intimate relationship where reciprocation cannot take the form of money, which 
will be discussed at length in Chapter 4, but this is a different argument. While it 
seems correct to say that women should not have to pay off their financial ‘debt’ to 
their husbands by doing extra emotion work, it does not seem correct to say that it is 
not the kind of work one ought to be paid for. In Hochschild’s account of the flight 
attendants, it seems that the problem occurs when conditions are present to cause 
alienation. This suggests that there are conditions where salaried emotional labour can 
be meaningful, fulfilling work. It would be controversial to state that it is wrong of a 
company to require their employees to be genuinely friendly or to seem interested in 
the concerns of their customers. In other words, the mere fact that someone is paid to 
perform emotional labour is not sufficient to call that work exploitative. Further, even 
if it was the case that emotional labour ought not be commodified, it is not clear that 
commodification of emotion work is what is occurring in intimate relationships. Even 
women who earn more than their husbands and therefore do not have a financial debt 
to pay off do more nurturing work than their husbands.   
The second form of degradation is the taking advantage of an existing 
injustice. This division of nurturing work is the result of patriarchy, where women are 
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expected to do more of this work than men are, and women face more serious costs 
for opting out of this kind of work than men do: we saw in Chapter One that women 
are held more accountable to the performance of emotion work than men are. In that 
way, then, many cases of such an unequal division of labour in personal relationships 
are taking advantage of an existing background injustice. This definition of 
exploitation is thus promising: women are degraded by the unequal division of 
nurturing work because it entails men taking advantage of an existing injustice, and 
this constitutes exploitation. It is probably also the case that this gendered division of 
labour would be far less prevalent if this injustice did not exist – if men faced the 
same costs for not doing nurturing work that women currently do, and if this 
constituted a motivation to do more nurturing work, then men would probably do 
more emotion work in a relationship.  
I still have a concern with this definition of exploitation, however. I want to 
provide an account of the wrongfulness of the unequal division of emotion work that 
is not wholly dependent on the oppression of women. We can imagine that a 
relationship in the present day (with its concomitant gender injustice) where a man 
does nearly all the nurturing work and the woman does almost none might still 
constitute an unfair distribution of nurturing work. In other words, the wrongfulness 
of an unequal division of labour is not merely that it is gendered – it is wrong in and 
of itself. This needs to be argued, and I will do so in the next chapter, but will simply 
note here that this is why I do not accept at this point that Sample’s ‘exploitation as 
degradation’ is the full explanation for the wrongfulness of an unequal division of 
nurturing work. However, in the next sub-section I look at precisely this kind of 
feminist argument in more detail, in order to flesh out this claim that an unequal 
distribution of nurturing work contributes to gender injustice.  
 
3.3. EXPLOITATION AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE OPPRESSION OF WOMEN 	
There is a third candidate for the wrongfulness of exploitation, and that is that it 
contributes to the oppression of women. In her book, Femininity and Domination 
(1990), Susan Bartky presents two ways in which it does this. Firstly, she argues that 
doing emotion work is a way of according status, and secondly, she argues that it 
contributes to the epistemological oppression and exclusion of women. I will tie this 
latter argument to Miranda Fricker’s book, Epistemic Injustice (2007), where she 
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provides an account of ‘hermeneutical marginalisation’, and I will argue that unequal 
distribution of emotion work contributes to the hermeneutical marginalisation of 
women. I will begin by explaining Fricker’s work.  
Briefly, ‘hermeneutical injustice’ refers to wrongful lacunae in hermeneutical7 
resources, and ‘hermeneutical marginalisation’ refers to the systematic exclusion of a 
group of people from the production of hermeneutical resources. Hermeneutical 
resources are those epistemological tools we use to make sense of our experiences. 
These phenomena can be explained as follows: society is structured by power 
relations, and it is the case that those who are more powerful have an unfair advantage 
in the formation of social meanings (Fricker, 2007:147), including in the production 
of hermeneutical resources. This is, in itself, not a problem for the majority of 
resources created, since both the oppressors and the oppressed in this case are 
humans, and as such have a large overlap in their experiences. However, if there is an 
experience that is specific to the oppressed group, perhaps as a result of their 
oppression, it is probable that there will be no existing hermeneutical resources to 
make sense of those experiences. Where there is an experience but no resources to 
make sense of that experience, there is what is known as a ‘hermeneutical lacuna’ 
(150). 
A good example of this phenomenon is that of sexual harassment. Before there 
was a name for sexual harassment, ‘there was a lacuna where the name of a 
distinctive social experience should be’ (151). There were individual instances of 
being touched inappropriately or sexually propositioned that could be laughed off by 
men as merely ‘flirting’ or ‘joking’. However, women experienced cognitive 
dissonance between the words of men and their own experiences: men called it 
flirting, but they experienced it as uncomfortable, degrading, and sometimes even 
traumatic. This example also illustrates what is at stake with hermeneutical 
marginalisation: women who quit their jobs due to sexual harassment could not 
explain why they had done so, and so missed on unemployment benefits, and 
advocacy to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace could only occur once it had 
already been labeled (150). 																																																																				
7 ‘Hermeneutics’ refers to the interpretation of texts, as well as the interpretation of the ‘whole social, 
historical, and psychological world’ (Blackburn, 2005: 165). Fricker’s work is of course about the 
second kind of hermeneutics rather than the first. 
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Susan Bartky, in her essay, Feeding Egos and Tending Wounds (1990), draws 
an interesting link between an unequal distribution of emotion work and the 
hermeneutical marginalisation of women.8 Bartky argues that the wrongfulness of 
such an unequal distribution of emotion work lies in the fact that it contributes to the 
oppression of women. One of the ways in which it does this is that it contributes to 
hermeneutical marginalisation. Her argument goes as follows: it is implicit in caring 
work that one has an ‘epistemic lean’ towards the perspective of the care-receiver 
(1990:111). This ‘epistemic lean’ is the opposite of a hermeneutic of suspicion: in 
order to do emotion work, one must believe the account which is being presented, and 
respond with sympathy to the way the speaker is situated in that account. This could 
involve, for example, responding with indignation to the reprimand of an employer, 
instead of pointing out that the reprimand may have been justified, or taking for 
granted the truth of the account instead of wondering if the harms committed have not 
been exaggerated (Bartky, 1990:111). As such, caregiving work often involves seeing 
the world from someone else’s perspective, ‘seeing the world according to him’ 
(112). Since it is the case that women do more of this specific form of caregiving than 
men do, this implies that seeing the world ‘according to him’ happens far more often 
than seeing the ‘world according to her’. As such, the hermeneutical resources he uses 
to make sense of his experiences are bolstered by her sympathy, whereas hers never 
are. The nurturing work expected from women thus perpetuates that status quo that 
hermeneutical resources generally and also more broadly culturally favour the 
experience of men.  
She argues that a further problem with an unequal division of emotion work is 
that it involves an asymmetrical bestowal of status.  She draws on the sociologist 
Theodore Kemper, who argues that, rather than romantic relationships being a site 
where status is irrelevant, ‘a love relationship is one in which at least one actor gives 
(or is prepared to give) extremely high status to another actor’ (Kemper quoted in 
Bartky, 109). The kind of emotion work studied by Hochschild that flight attendants 
																																																																				
8	Bartky’s work precedes Fricker’s by some decades, and so she does not use the terms ‘hermeneutical 
injustice’ or ‘hermeneutical marginalisation’, but this essay of hers is certainly about the same 
phenomenon, so I will keep using this term for convenience.  	
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typically perform is exactly the kind that elevates status: it is work that functions to 
make the interlocutor feel important and heard, and to give him a platform on which 
to express his views and feelings. Emotion work thus constitutes a kind of status 
accord, where the self-esteem of individuals depends on how much emotion work is 
done for them. When this caregiving is asymmetrical, it constitutes and reinforces a 
performance of higher status for the man and a lower status for the woman. Whenever 
he does not reciprocate her caring work, ‘he confirms for her, and just as importantly, 
for himself, her inferior position in the hierarchy of gender’ (109). For Bartky, 
asymmetrical nurturing work is no less than a perpetual affirmation of the superiority 
of men and the inferiority of women, and as such, perpetuates patriarchy in its 
performance. This is therefore another way in which disproportional emotion work 
contributes to the oppression of women.  
Let us consider the cumulative effect of gendered status accord. If the 
distribution of emotion work is gendered in the majority of heterosexual couples, this 
means that effectively most of the population is taught that women are inferior on a 
daily basis. A woman who performs emotion work without reciprocation does not 
only demonstrate her male partner’s superiority to herself and to him, but also to her 
children. It is plausible that this contributes to the lower status attributed to women by 
society, and thereby contributes to the oppression of women. 
Despite the fact that Bartky does not believe that Marxism applies successfully 
to emotion work in the home, she nevertheless draws an interesting Marxist 
conclusion: even if work in the home does not match a Marxist account of labour and 
the exploitation thereof, there is a way in which hermeneutical marginalisation causes 
alienation. She draws on Marx’s account of the human being, where we are 
differentiated from animals not just by our productivity, but because we create 
cultural artifacts and meanings, including institutions, belief systems, and sets of 
assumptions (1990:34). She refers to the exclusion of women from participating in the 
generation of social meanings as ‘the cultural domination of women’ (35), which is 
the same phenomenon as Fricker’s epistemic and hermeneutical marginalisation. The 
implication of cultural domination is that women are prohibited from exercising a 
core feature of their humanity, and as such are alienated from their species being.  
This account therefore posits that the wrongfulness in the gendered 
distribution of emotion work resides in the fact that it contributes to the oppression of 
women. The advantage of this account is that it situates the discussion of the unequal 
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distribution of labour in a patriarchal reality, and thereby highlights the social 
significance of the problem, while at the same time accounting for the fact that 
women and men participate in this phenomenon largely unconsciously. It further does 
not depend on an account of exploitation that maps well onto the home or on an 
account of fairness. However, I would still like to explore the possibility of producing 
an account that could explain the wrongfulness of an unequal division of nurturing 
work even if the one doing more work is male, or, for example, if they are in a 
homosexual relationship.  
Further, if it is the case that the real problem is hermeneutical marginalisation 
as an aspect of status degradation, then we ought to be seeking the most efficacious 
interventions into that problem. It is probably the case that exclusion from positions 
of public power is more important than an unequal status accorded in the home. If so, 
then interventions such as affirmative action, particularly in fields that focus on 
knowledge-creation such as academia, or supporting women-run media forums such 
as movies, television, and literature would be more effective in allowing the 
participation of women in the production of social meanings. If that is the case, and 
these actions would constitute a sufficient intervention into hermeneutical 
marginalisation, then that would justify  leaving the status quo of gendered division of 
nurturing work as is, except insofar as these other interventions may indirectly affect 
it.  
 
CONCLUSION 	
This chapter gave an account of two kinds of exploitation that women face due to the 
unequal distribution of nurturing work in the home: an economic account of how 
women are exploited under capitalism via their work in the home, and a moralised 
philosophical account of exploitation that shows women are exploited because the 
unequal distribution of nurturing work degrades them. In exploring the economic 
account of exploitation, I also looked at the particular kinds of alienation that arise 
when what is being exploited is one’s emotional labour, and extended this to the 
home. Though there are possibly some circumstances in the home which could 
replicate the alienation that occurs in the workplace, those circumstances would only 
occur for a minority of women, and further likely present for only a short period of 
those women’s lives. In short, it can only account for the wrongfulness of such 
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exploitation if a woman is so overworked that she has no resources to invest sincerity 
into her emotion work, whereas we need an account that will explain the 
wrongfulness of a far less drastic scenario. 
I then moved away from the kinds of exploitation arguments that are limited to 
the workplace to look at some other accounts of exploitation and how they explain the 
wrongfulness of exploitation. Wertheimer’s account of exploitation proved unfruitful 
because it is a conventionalist account where the status quo is used to determine 
fairness. Since we are working with a case where the status quo is what is unfair, 
given the unequal ‘relationship market opportunities’ of men and women, the 
wrongfulness of playing according to a (unfair) market cannot be explained. Goodin’s 
account is similar to Wertheimers’s in that it relies on convention to determine 
whether exploitation takes place, but with the caveat that it may sometimes be 
necessary to suspend convention in an engagement in the event of vulnerability. I 
showed that since women in these kinds of romantic relationships are not especially 
vulnerable, this caveat does not apply, and so we are left only with Goodin’s 
conventionalist account, which is no better than Wertheimer’s. 
We are then left with our two most promising accounts, which do account for 
some of the wrongfulness of unequal nurturing work. Sample’s account defines 
exploitation as degradation, where someone’s intrinsic work is not respected in an 
interaction. One of the ways in which this happens is if someone benefits by taking 
advantage of an existing injustice. This shows the wrongfulness of a gendered 
distribution of nurturing work in a patriarchal society, and imposes a strong moral 
obligation to refrain from exploiting someone in this manner. The wrongfulness is 
dependent on the existing injustice, and, as such, one cannot conclude from this that 
an unequal distribution of nurturing work is wrongful as such.  
Finally, the last argument suggested that an unequal distribution of nurturing 
work is wrong insofar as it contributes to the oppression of women via asymmetrical 
status accord and hermeneutical marginalisation. Though I found this argument 
convincing, it still seems to be missing something in the wrongfulness of such 
exploitative distribution of labour, since it implies that when a man exploits his 
female partner, he only wrongs her insofar as she is a member of a group who is 
oppressed by hermeneutical marginalisation. It seems to me that it should be possible 
to produce an account that explains a way in which a woman as an individual can be 
wronged by her partner exploiting her by not reciprocating her emotional work. 
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Secondly, once again, this can only explain the wrongfulness of men exploiting 
women, and not the wrongfulness of an unequal distribution of nurturing work in 
general.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ETHICS OF CARE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter showed that a gendered division of nurturing work is wrong for 
two reasons: firstly, it is exploitative because men benefit from an existing injustice, 
and secondly, because it contributes to the oppression of women by reducing their 
status. This chapter consists of the final route that will explore the wrongfulness of an 
unequal distribution of nurturing work to ascertain if it is wrong as such, or only when 
it is gendered, and it does so by looking more closely at the nature of nurturing work. 
I will begin by attempting to ascertain whether or not any distribution of 
nurturing work within the heterosexual couple could be acceptable, or whether such a 
distribution needs to be more or less equal. I use Michael Sandel’s arguments in his 
book, What Money Can’t Buy (2012) to argue that financial disparity in couples is, at 
the very least, insufficient to justify an unequal division of nurturing work, and also 
show that nurturing work is  not work with mere utility that could be performed by 
someone paid to do so.  
I still need to establish whether an unequal division of nurturing work is 
wrong per se. In section 4.2, I turn to the ethics of care as formulated by Joan Tronto 
in order to determine what moral obligations can be extracted from it. This chapter 
will look at the insights that the ethics of care gives particularly about how the 
peculiar nature of care gives rise to moral discourses and obligations. In order to make 
this useful for my discussion, I will need to show that there is sufficient overlap or 
similarities between what I have dubbed nurturing work and care. I believe this can 
easily be done, and so intend to apply the ethics of care to nurturing work. If I can 
show that there is a general obligation to reciprocate care, and if I can extend this to 
nurturing work, it would account for the wrongfulness of an unequal division of 
nurturing work.  
 
4.1. MONEY CAN’T BUY YOU NURTURING WORK 
 
Care in the context of intimate relationships seems to be the kind of thing that cannot 
be compensated for with money. In other words, it seems wrong that one partner does 
all the caring and is not taken care of, even if she earns much less than her husband 
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and is therefore indirectly financially compensated for her care work. This point is not 
uncontroversial, so I will argue that this is the case below. I have chosen two kinds of 
arguments to show that this is the case. There are doubtless some more arguments, but 
I will argue this using, firstly, Michael Sandel’s arguments about why some things 
cannot or ought not to be monetised. Secondly, I will look at the account given about 
the nature of care by Joan Tronto, and show that because care is a particular kind of 
moral activity it cannot be outsourced. 
In his book, What Money Can’t Buy (2012), Michael Sandel argues that some 
things cannot or ought not to be monetised for two main reasons: firstly, the 
monetisation of that thing could lead to coercive practices given unequal power in a 
market, and secondly, because the introduction of money can degrade it, or crowd out 
the morality associated with it (110). Both are applicable here, and we will begin with 
how the monetisation of nurturing work can lead to coercion.  
One example of how monetisation can lead to coercion is related to the sale of 
organs like kidneys – if a kidney can be purchased, it may well improve allocative 
efficiency, and furthermore be beneficial to those who donate the kidneys. However, 
if this is the case, then those whose kidneys will be bought are likely to be the very 
vulnerable. Most people would not choose to make money by undergoing painful 
surgery, and if people do, it will probably be the result of coercion. Nurturing work is 
not directly analogous, since doing nurturing work is by no means as painful or as 
risky as donating kidneys. However, the monetisation of nurturing work can be 
coercive. If it is possible to ‘buy’ oneself out of nurturing work since one earns more 
money, many men will be able to do so. In most couples men earn more than women, 
and this is the consequence of existing injustice: firstly, there is the gender pay gap, 
where women earn significantly less than men, even in the most gender-equal 
countries. Secondly, we saw in chapter two that women are made vulnerable in 
anticipation of marriage.  
In terms of economics, people in non-coercive, already fair market conditions 
will make choices to maximise their utility. Under these conditions, then, women 
would agree to do extra nurturing work for money because it is worth the money for 
them to do so. However, this description of these arrangements is incorrect: rather 
than doing care work for the money, women are ‘obligated’ to do more care work 
because their husbands earn more than they do. Therefore, because of her inferior 
financial position, a woman is coerced into doing more nurturing work. We saw in 
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chapter 1 that even women who earn more may do more nurturing work than their 
partners in order to preserve her partner’s dominance (‘power balancing’). It may be 
the case that some women would prefer to earn more doing other kinds of work, but 
perhaps their earnings are limited because they take on more responsibility for 
housework or childcare, or perhaps because they chose dead-end jobs or low-earning 
careers because of their gendered expectations of marriage. If the woman’s lower 
earnings is not even due to her different number of paid work hours, or different kind 
of career, but rather due to the gender pay gap, then it is especially clear that women 
should not have to do extra nurturing work to ‘pay off’ their husbands for their higher 
earnings.  
The second reason that Sandel gives for why market norms are not always 
appropriate is because the introduction of market norms can degrade the activity by 
putting a price on it. Some of the examples he mentions is the ‘purchasing’ of a baby, 
where the most desirable child goes to the highest bidder, rather than working through 
the normal process of an adoption agency (2012:111). This is wrong, he argues, 
because putting a price on an infant degrades the infant, and perhaps also the 
opportunity to be a parent. If it is true that ‘paying’ for nurturing work in a 
relationship corrupts it, it means that the introduction of market norms degrades 
nurturing work in some way. Therefore, if the wealthier partner ‘buys’ their way out 
of nurturing work, they are effectively labeling nurturing work as something that can 
be bought, and perhaps treating it as such degrades it. This may be an empirical 
question: do people value nurturing work less if they have paid for it? Is nurturing 
work less effective because it has been paid for? 
Of course, nurturing work has already been commodified to a large extent. We 
have seen that the friendliness of air hostesses constitute emotional labour. Care is 
commodified in the form of old age homes, nurses, child daycare or nannies. 
However, the question is not whether or not nurturing work can be commodified as 
such, but whether or not nurturing work in a relationship can be commodified, 
without some kind of loss. 
There are a few reasons why we might think that paying for it can corrupt 
nurturing work, and two of those are the ways in which care is analogous to some 
other examples Sandel raises of degradation by payment. Firstly, Sandel explores the 
phenomenon of gifts: gifts are puzzling because they do not cohere with the notion of 
allocative efficiency – an individual is almost always better at knowing what they 
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want than their friends are. In fact, it seems that the receivers of gifts would pay less 
for gifts they receive than the giver did (in other words, they underestimate the cost of 
the gift) (100). For this reason, from an economics perspective, it is more efficient to 
give people money instead of gifts so that they can purchase the things that they want 
the most. However, giving money is qualitatively different to giving gifts. This might 
be because gifts are not merely transferring objects, but rather, the gift does extra 
work on top of the monetary value of the object: it serves to perform love, and to 
cement a relationship. Further, if one were to repay someone for a gift, that would 
change the nature of the gift: instead of representing all of these benefits for the 
relationship, it would turn it into a simple transaction, which effectively cancels the 
gift. A further (and probably related) example is that of sex. Sex can be monetised in 
the form of sex work, but it is once again qualitatively different to non-paid sex which 
is given freely, even enthusiastically, which affirms the value and status of the 
receiver. One need not rely on a significance view of sexuality9 to claim that sex 
means different things in these different contexts, and if sex within a relationship 
were paid for like sex work, this would count as degradation. 
Nurturing work may be analogous to these two things: gifts and sex both mean 
particular things in a relationship, and do work that contributes to the quality of the 
relationship. Replacing gifts or sex with transactions removes all the work that these 
things can do for a relationship. In a similar way, it is plausible that if nurturing work 
done in a relationship becomes a transaction, it will no longer do the extra work for 
the relationship, such as cultivating intimacy, letting someone feel loved, and 
demonstrate love and affection. If the caregiver does care work because she is being 
paid for it, and if the care-receiver feels entitled to care work because he is paying for 
it, it can no longer perform those functions for a relationship. Further, one cannot buy 
oneself out of that work because the goods offered by nurturing work cannot be 
reduced to mere utility that can be allocated elsewhere. In other words, it seems that 
nurturing work is good in and of itself, which cannot be substituted for other kinds of 
goods, and also cannot be bestowed by a surrogate. Nurturing work cannot be reduced 
to mere utility, and must be done by those party to the relationship, and as such is 
non-distributable.  																																																																				
5 The significance view claims that sex is only morally acceptable if it is an expression of romantic 
love (Benatar, 2002:192). 
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There is further reason to think that the monetisation of nurturing work will 
involve a serious cost, and that is the moral nature of nurturing work. This is a claim 
made by the ethics of care – that care has a particular moral value, and this claim can 
be extended to nurturing work. Sandel argues that in some cases, market principles 
crowd out morals, and so the moral value of nurturing work can be crowded out by 
market principles. For example, in Switzerland, a nuclear waste site needed to be 
found, and when the best site was found, consent had to be acquired from the people 
living close to the site (Sandel, 2012:115). A slight majority consented to the presence 
of the nuclear waste site. However, when this consent was incentivised – in other 
words, people would benefit financially from the proximity of the site – the number of 
those consenting dropped. Sandel argues that this is because, where there is no money 
involved, consent was seen as a civic sacrifice done for the good of the community, 
whereas when financial incentive was introduced, it seemed that consenting would 
mean taking a bribe to accept the degradation of the community (117). This could be 
applied to care in two ways: firstly, if the caregiver is paid for her nurturing work, 
then it is less likely that she will see her work as achieving a moral value. It seems 
likely that women who do more nurturing work in their families would reject any 
claim they do it because of the money, and it would degrade the work in their eyes: 
they do it because they believe it has moral value in their relationships. Of course, we 
know that women do more nurturing work because of gendered expectations, and the 
lower status of women likely also means they need to do more nurturing work. 
However, at least at a psychological level, many women probably do more nurturing 
work because they want to do something good for the people they love, and because 
they are interested in building and maintaining relationships, which is considered a 
moral activity by the ethics of care. In other words, they have a personal investment in 
doing the work, which far exceeds the monetary worth it might also entail. 
Finally, emotion work is irreducible and impossible to outsource. Cooking and 
cleaning is work that can be outsourced if one has reasonable means, or which can be 
relieved by technology, such as a washing machine or a dishwasher, or ready-to-eat 
meals and so on. Even grocery shopping can be automated. These kinds of work can 
be simplified, and take up less and less time. On the other hand, emotion work seems 
to be irreducible: every attempt to streamline, outsource, or automate it will also 
degrade it. Lessening the effort and work that goes into the activity is not desirable in 
the same way that doing so for housework would be. Rather, the effort or labour put 
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into a relationship demonstrates the importance of the other person and of that 
relationship. This is significant because it means that the problem of division of 
nurturing work is inherent to it, and so cannot dissolve like the division of housework, 
which will become less and less if better technology becomes available and more 
affordable.  
Further, it is not clear that emotion work is the kind of thing that one can pay 
other people (who are not in the relationship) to do – one cannot outsource the 
cultivation of friendships, or the responsibility for someone’s health (at least beyond 
the domestic unit), or emotion work in a relationship. There are of course examples of 
emotion work that are monetised, such as therapy, customer service and its 
concomitant status elevation, or nursing, but even these cannot make one feel loved or 
sufficiently supported in the relevant way – we cannot be affirmed as the individuals 
that we are in these kinds of work. Monetised care work such as therapy and nursing 
are usually reserved for extreme circumstances, and are not necessarily equipped to 
anticipate needs in the same way that an intimate partner can do. Finally, and most 
obviously, the kind of work that care does to cement a relationship or cultivate 
intimacy can only be done by those party to that relationship. 
 
4.2. THE ETHICS OF CARE 
4.2.1 THE NATURE OF CARE  
 
I have tried to show throughout this paper that nurturing work is in fact work, but I 
have also argued that nurturing work that occurs in a relationship is qualitatively 
different to other kinds of work. I have done so by pointing out how it is not like 
commercialised work. It is time now to turn to a more positive account of what is 
particular about care. Writers in the ethics of care have done much work to identify 
those things, and I will explore that now. I will use Joan Tronto’s formulation in her 
book, Moral Boundaries (1993), for my understanding of care ethics.   
In order to use the ethics of care to provide insights into the moral nature of 
nurturing work, I need to show that the similarities between how care-ethicists define 
care and how I define nurturing work are sufficient to extrapolate those insights to 
nurturing work. It is difficult to find one standard definition of care – care is defined 
by different theorists as an attitude, a virtue, a value, a kind of work, a practice, an 
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activity, and more (Held, 2006:32-33). Tronto defines care as a ‘species activity that 
includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that 
we can live in it as well as possible’ (1993:103). This definition is so broad that it 
would be difficult for it not to include nurturing work. However, Tronto’s other 
writing on care does not suggest that she thinks that care is such a broad activity. 
Firstly, she claims that care seems to ‘involve taking the concerns and needs of the 
other as the basis for action’ (105). Secondly, she shows that caring has four elements 
or phases that need to be present for it to constitute the relevant moral activity, and the 
presence of these four phases seems to narrow the kinds of activities that constitute 
care beyond the act of building or maintaining the world.  
The four phases of caring correspond to four ethical components. The four 
phases are as follows: i).‘caring about’, which entails noticing the need to care; ii) 
‘taking care of’, which entails taking responsibility for care; iii) care-giving, which is 
the actual work of care, and iv) care-receiving, which is being attentive to the 
response of the care-receiver in order to determine if their needs have in fact been met 
(106-108). There are four moral elements to caring, each of which is required by a 
phase of caring. Firstly, there is that of attentiveness, which corresponds to ‘caring 
about’: this involves being skilled at noticing when care is required, or alternatively 
stated, noticing needs (1993:106). Since being attentive is a moral activity, a failure to 
notice a need is a moral evil, and conversely, becoming good at noticing needs is a 
moral achievement (127).  
The second moral element is that of responsibility, which of course 
corresponds to ‘taking care of’. Tronto claims that responsibility is different to an 
obligation, since it is not determined by moral duties, but is rather context-dependent 
– the context will determine if someone feels responsible for care work and therefore 
take responsibility for it. For instance, if one notices a need that no one else will meet, 
this may or may not result in one feeling responsible for meeting that need (132). 
Responsibility is rooted in ‘political motivations, cultural practices, and individual 
psychology’ (132). Taking responsibility for someone’s need can also involve 
delegating the actual of work of doing so to the appropriate agents. For example, one 
could remind one’s spouse to exercise or make an appointment with a doctor.  
The third moral element is competence, where one’s caregiving must be 
successful at making the care-receiver feel taken care of. This means that the intention 
to give good care or even an attempt to care is insufficient: one must also be 
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competent at caregiving. There is thus an obligation to become good at caring. The 
final element is responsiveness, where the carer must listen to the response of the 
care-receiver, must ‘consider the other’s position as the other expresses it’ (132), and 
amend the care given in response to what the other expresses. To summarise, for 
appropriate caring, the carer must identify needs accurately, take responsibility for 
those needs, be successful in alleviating those needs, and listen to the care-receiver if 
they express different needs or preferred ways of those needs being met. Tronto 
asserts that in order to provide good care, all four of these elements need to be 
present, providing care which is integrated (255). 
I would argue that nurturing work certainly possesses all of these phases and 
elements of caring. Each of the activities (housework, emotion work, and what I have 
referred to as care) entails noticing needs, whether that need is to repurchase an item 
that is running out in the kitchen, or putting in a load of laundry because someone is 
on their second-last shirt, making sure someone eats enough protein or takes their 
medication, or noticing that one’s partner is unhappy and worn out. Secondly, beyond 
noticing the need, it entails making the need your problem – taking responsibility for 
addressing the need. Thirdly, the actual doing of the nurturing work involves 
competence – the work is not done if the need was not successfully met. Finally, 
nurturing work must also entail responsiveness, in the sense that it makes no sense to 
express care towards one’s partner in a way that is not received as caring. For 
example, someone notices her partner is stressed out and upset, and knows that she 
likes to unwind by talking about her concerns over a glass of wine, and so pours her 
partner a glass of wine and asks him what’s wrong. If in fact what he would require in 
order to feel less stressed out is to be relieved of his responsibilities for an hour so that 
he can exercise, take a bath, or read a book, then her attempt to care for his needs 
would be ineffective. 
I would suggest that, based on this description of care, the nature of nurturing 
work is sufficiently similar to care to apply the moral insights from care to nurturing 
work. At this point I would like to remind the reader that I am trying to establish the 
wrongfulness of an unequal distribution of nurturing work. My discussion of the 
distinctive features is an attempt to determine if there is a moral obligation that arises 
merely from the nature of care itself, which would then make it a moral failure to fail 
to meet this moral obligation, and hence explain the wrongfulness of doing less 
nurturing work than your partner. Since the ethics of care specifically defines care as 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
	 85	
a particular kind of moral activity, I will attempt to determine what kinds of moral 
claims can be made based on this theory.  
The ethics of care has one characteristic that makes it unable to impose strong, 
universal moral obligations: its emphasis on context and existing relationships. As 
Tronto puts it, ‘we are better served by focusing on a flexible notion of responsibility 
than we are by continuing to use obligation as the basis for understanding what people 
should do for each other’ (133). Recall that the second element of care is that of 
responsibility, and Tronto specifies that responsibility is rooted in context, and will be 
determined by contingent factors, including culture and gender roles. This claim is 
descriptive rather than normative: Tronto does not argue that anyone ought to take 
responsibility for anyone else, but rather that some people might feel responsible and 
therefore choose to take responsibility. This approach is inherently conservative, since 
it uses the status quo as its starting point largely uncritically. Further, if universal 
moral values are eschewed in favour of context, there are no grounds on which the 
context as it is can be critiqued.  
A further example of this phenomenon in ethics of care can be seen in the 
work of Eva Feder Kittay, who tries to derive strong moral entitlements from the 
ethics of care. I will look at her chapter ‘Vulnerability and the Moral Nature of 
Dependency’ (2005) to show how she uses the ethics of care to determine what moral 
claims can be made about dependency work. Briefly, dependency work is the care 
work done for the vulnerable, such as the very young, the very old, or the infirm. Hers 
is chiefly a political theory which relies on the entitlements of citizens, and thus, 
unlike Tronto, she makes use of universal moral principles. Nevertheless, it will be 
shown in the next paragraph that her theory is equally conservative due to its similar 
reliance on context. Kittay asserts two kinds of entitlements: the first is that every 
person is entitled to the kind of relationship in which they may be cared for, and 
secondly that everyone is entitled to be supported in their role as carers (2005:273). 
She states that she is less interested in how people come to acquire an obligation to 
care, and rather starts from those who are already in relationships where they care for 
others, and looks at how they are to be supported in that. The reason for this is that 
caring is essential, but sometimes very costly to the care-provider. In order to prevent 
these costs from becoming unreasonably taxing, adequate support must be provided 
for the care-provider. 
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Since Kittay is interested in dependency work, the care-receivers in this kind 
of work are usually incapable of reciprocating care, and so cannot themselves provide 
the support their carers need (266). As such, standard reciprocity where the other 
party responds in kind, in the same amount and immediately afterwards, cannot be 
applied here. Instead, she suggests a model of reciprocity-in-connection, which is a 
nested model of care (273). The idea is that every caregiver must also have a 
caretaker. She does not suggest outsourcing this to government, but rather thinks 
communities must be organised in this way, and she believes they will be organised in 
this way because some people already feel responsible to care for others. For instance, 
one woman says that she has to take care of her elderly mother because her mother 
cared for her mother, and there is no one else to do it, so because her mother played 
the role of daughter caring for mother, the woman in question also has to play the role 
of daughter caring for her mother (273). This is reminiscent of Tronto’s notion of 
responsibility: this woman feels responsible for the care of her mother, but not 
because she has a moral obligation to do so. In other words, Kittay does not argue that 
one has an obligation to care for one’s parents, or for other persons generally, but 
rather argues that if one already feels responsible for the needs of another, then one 
will take responsibility for doing so. It is thus a factual question, ‘who feels 
responsible for whom?’, rather than a normative question, ‘who has an obligation to 
care for whom?’.  
It should be clear at this point that the fact that this woman feels responsible to 
care for her mother is a case of gendered injustice, since men in general do not seem 
to feel similarly responsible. The idea of reciprocity-in-connection instead of 
reciprocity means that as long as the carers are cared for, the fair allocation of care is 
superfluous. Since we know that women do more caring than men, female carers are 
likely to be taken care of by other female carers, while men are also taken care of by 
female carers, without being nested themselves in the responsibility to care for 
specific others. Further, it is hard to locate responsibility to provide care: Kittay 
mentions that if an existing relationship of care has moral warrant, then the carer has 
an obligation to care (272). It is unclear what kind of prior relation would have moral 
warrant. Beyond that, she claims that we are entitled to care and support for our 
caregiving, but she does not assert a corresponding duty for the entitlement. It is 
therefore not clear that if someone is entitled to the kind of relationship where they 
can be cared for, that any individual person has a corresponding duty to provide that 
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care. Caregivers are also entitled to support for their care, but it does not seem that 
any duty is placed on individuals to provide that care. As such, the entitlement cannot 
do any work.  
Let us take an example of someone who has a mental illness such as 
depression. It seems right to say that if such a person is so depressed that she cannot 
reciprocate care, this should not exclude her from receiving care. One could perhaps 
even go so far as to say that such a person is entitled to be cared for. However, this 
surely does not imply that when  a stranger encounters such a person, he is obligated 
as an individual to befriend her and to provide her with care. We could make a more 
general statement that quality mental illness institutions such as psychiatric 
institutions must be made available for those who need it, which would impose a 
corresponding duty on the state, and consequently the entitlement to relationships 
where care is typically provided is empty. Further, saying that someone is entitled to 
be cared for when they are suffering from mental illness (which could be addressed 
with psychiatric institutions) is different to saying that someone is entitled to the kind 
of relationships where care is provided. Of course, families often do fulfill this role, 
but it is strange to say that those without families are entitled to other non-relatives to 
fulfill the role that family would beyond childhood.  
Kittay’s work is thus a good example of the kinds of obligations that can be 
established by an ethic of care. It makes sense that Kittay argues for a different model 
of reciprocity, given that her focus is dependency work, but since I am interested in 
men and women who are capable of caring and yet distribute nurturing work in a 
gendered way, I need a more robust form of reciprocity that can impose an obligation 
on a specific individual towards another specific individual.  
Let us then turn back to Tronto’s understanding of ethics of care. She claims 
that the ethics of care is not interested in the question ‘What, if anything, do I (we) 
owe to others?’, but rather the question, ‘How can I (we) best meet my (our) caring 
responsibilities?’(137). Again, the important difference here is that ‘caring 
responsibilities’ is a factual question of who already feels responsible for meeting the 
needs of others, whereas the question of what we owe to others would establish a 
moral obligation to care for others, even if one does not already feel responsible for 
another’s needs. This means that she is explicitly not interested in determining when 
one has obligation to provide care, but rather starts with existing caring relationships 
and the responsibilities that seem to flow from them. Therefore, if one does not 
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already believe that one has a responsibility to care, then there is no way to establish 
such a responsibility from the point of view of this theory. If this is the case, it will 
naturally be very difficult to establish an obligation to care. There is a greater 
problem, however: if it is a factual question of who already bears caring 
responsibilities, then the ethics of care only applies to women and the few men who 
are already carers. Tronto specifies that our caring responsibilities are determined by 
who we are and where we are situated. This is reminiscent of Kittay’s discussion on 
Goodin: she states that we should not use Goodin’s ‘pragmatic ought’, which states 
that existing relationships of responsibility should be considered a ‘social fact’, and 
moral obligations attach to those already in such relationships in the event of the 
other’s vulnerability (Goodin in Kittay, 269). Kittay discards the notion of the 
‘pragmatic ought’ precisely because social facts are so often oppressive. Kittay 
nevertheless roots the responsibility to do dependency work in the following factors: 
1) basic needs need to be met, 2) a person is very vulnerable, and 3) ‘the prior 
relation, which puts a particular individual into position of having to assume such a 
vulnerability-responsive obligation, has a moral warrant’ (2005:272).  
At no point in Kittay’s chapter does she explain beyond the fact of 
vulnerability how a dependency relationship has moral warrant. She seems to include 
this provision to ensure that slaves cannot be beholden in this dependency-
relationship with slave-owners. Perhaps it is possible to argue that, given that the 
greater burden of care on women is an injustice, their care-responsibilities have no 
moral warrant. However, since many of these are still intimate relationships, it simply 
seems untrue that the dependency relationship has no moral warrant. Regardless, 
Kittay does not make these claims about the responsibility to care generally, but only 
about dependency work, whereas Tronto makes no attempt to show how people have 
caring responsibilities beyond the social fact of their gendered burden. The ethics of 
care as formulated by these two theorists is thus plagued by a problem: it is vague in 
its allocation of responsibilities and cannot convincingly situate an obligation to care. 
Because of this, despite being a feminist ethic, it is not useful in arguing for a fairer 
and less gendered allocation of nurturing work.  
 
4.2.2. CARE AS A VIRTUE  
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In order to address the shortcoming of vagueness in terms of moral responsibility, 
Raja Halwani attempts to subsume care into virtue ethics and define it as a primary 
virtue, which means that it is a virtue ranked more important than many other virtues, 
and is essential for living well (2003:183). She argues that in order for care to be 
considered a virtue it needs to adhere to the definition of a virtue and bear the 
criterion of a virtue, which is that it must contribute to human flourishing (182). 
Aristotle’s definition of virtue is a ‘state involving choice and lying in a mean, with a 
mean relative to the individual’ (182). In other words, care needs to be the kind of 
thing that one can choose to do ‘at the right times, about the right things, toward the 
right people, and in the right way’ (182). Care certainly appears to match this: it 
should be clear by now that care is a choice, rather than a personality trait that one 
either has or does not have. Care can fall into a mean: it is possible to provide too 
much care and be smothering, and it is possible to provide too little – in other words, 
care can be defective or vicious (182). There are appropriate times and circumstances 
to offer care, and the right and wrong people to offer care to. Halwani offers a modern 
definition of virtue as well, as conceptualised by Linda Zabzebski: virtue is ‘a deep 
and enduring acquired excellence with a characteristic motivation to bring about a 
certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end’ (Zabzebski quoted 
in Halwani, 2003:182). Care is certainly this kind of thing as well: one can be good or 
bad at care, and become better at it, and it is only good care if it actually successfully 
meets someone’s needs.  
Secondly, care must satisfy the criterion of being a virtue: it must be linked to 
eudaimonia, where, along with other virtues, care is causally effective in bringing 
about human flourishing for the moral agent (183). Human relationships are essential 
in bringing about flourishing, and care is essential for human relationships, and so it 
assists in human flourishing. Further, if we take the insights of the ethics of care 
seriously, where offering care and being cared for are essential parts of the human 
experience, then caring is also a way of being characteristically human.  It thus seems 
plausible that care be subsumed under virtue ethics without too much lost, and much 
clarity gained. There is much debate on this subject, but it seems to me that care 
ethics as a kind of virtue ethics is the strongest formulation of care ethics, since it 
escapes much of its original vagueness. It further manages to elevate the status of care 
as an important moral activity that forms part of the right way to live. 
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However, even such a strong formulation of the ethics of care does not 
manage to solve the problem of addressing an unequal distribution of such work. 
Firstly, if care is a virtue, women get some benefit from doing more of it – they 
become more virtuous, and they would tend to flourish more and experience more 
happiness and fulfillment. If this the case, it is not clear why a woman should 
complain about doing more care work than her partner. If she is both improving her 
moral character as well as increasing her chances of human flourishing, a woman 
should be happy to do care work even if her partner does none. We can compare this 
to Jean Hampton’s contractarian test from Chapter 2: testing for exploitation by 
determining whether the costs and benefits are distributed in such a way that a self-
interested person can accept it is contrary to the ethic of care. This is because a 
woman is being given an opportunity to become virtuous, which is a good apart from 
whether or not her relationship is fair to her, or if she is taken care of. In fact, if a 
woman does see it this way, this will contribute to her reluctance to insist on being 
cared for. 
Though the conceptualisation of care as a virtue elevates the status of the care 
work that a person does, it seems that the consequence of this is the valorisation of 
women who engage in care work, which reinforces the ‘angel in the household’ trope. 
This trope refers to the kind of self-sacrificing woman who cares for everyone without 
being cared for in return. It therefore makes it seem that she ought to be sufficiently 
praised for her moral goodness, but it certainly does not impose an obligation on 
others to care equally well for her.  
However, insofar as care is a virtue, it perhaps imposes a weak obligation to 
be a good carer on men and women alike. In order to be a virtuous person, one must 
be a good carer. This formulation is different from a deontological formulation, which 
would frame this as follows: one has a duty to refrain from exploiting others, and so 
one must be a good carer; or, by not reciprocating one’s partner’s care, one is 
wronging one’s partner by failing to discharge one’s duty to them. The virtue ethics 
formulation also does not allow us to look at the quality of the relationship, and 
whether or not the relationship flourishes. Rather, being a good carer and engaging in 
care work are important for the cultivation of a good moral character and in human 
flourishing. Let us then cash out this weak moral obligation. 
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4.3. A WEAK OBLIGATION TO PERFORM NURTURING WORK 
 
We have thus established the following weak obligations: ‘in order to be a good 
person, one must be a good carer’, and ‘in order to flourish as a human being, one 
must be a good carer’. This naturally applies to men as well as women, and this 
means that men who are not currently good carers need to become such in order to be 
good people and in order to flourish as human beings. This weak obligation is still 
different to the notion of ‘responsibility’ offered by Kittay and Tronto, because it 
exists apart from the fact of being nested in relationships and already feeling 
responsible for others. In other words, it is not a factual claim, but a normative one. 
Given that, let us tease out what this means for unequal caring relationships which are 
unequal because one partner provides insufficient care work. 
Firstly, in order to cultivate the virtue of care, a number of component skills 
need to be acquired, and these are the four moral elements of care that Tronto 
identifies. A person needs to become good at attentiveness, taking responsibility for 
others’ needs, for effectively meeting those needs, and being responsive to how the 
care-receiver has received the care. This is useful because it refutes a common excuse 
for doing less nurturing work: that the person simply didn’t notice the other’s need, or 
tried but failed to meet that need. The fact that a man has not been socialised into 
being good at nurturing work does not alleviate the obligation to acquire such a skill.  
Further, by associating care with an individual’s virtue and therefore 
eudaimonia, it means that it cannot be a casualty to a pragmatic distribution of work. I 
am referring to the conversations that couples have justifying the current, unequal 
distribution of work, where the female partner would rather do the work herself 
because she is better at anticipating needs. For example, one woman I know takes on 
all the cooking, because even though her partner is a very competent cook, he is very 
bad at having food ready at a reasonable time when she is hungry, instead of, for 
instance, at 11 o’clock in the evening. While it is impossible to assert from virtue 
ethics that he has a particular moral obligation to his partner to address her hunger on 
the basis of care ethics, it would be necessary for the cultivation of his own virtue of 
caring to be more effective in meeting her needs.  
Subsuming being a good nurturer under individual virtue has a further 
advantage, which is that it means the responsibility to become better at nurturing 
work resides with the individual, and not his partner. Because of the way in which 
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boys and girls are socialised differently, it is usually the case that adult men simply 
are worse at nurturing work than their female partners. This can often mean that if a 
woman wants her partner to be better at nurturing work, she has to train him to be. 
However, if being good at nurturing work is necessary to be a virtuous person with a 
chance at flourishing as a human being, then he should want to acquire those skills 
independently of what his partner wants.   
It can be seen that even though the obligation is not a strong one, it 
nevertheless is not insignificant. Care as a virtue gives us a reason to think that 
individuals must become good at caring, for their own good, and the ethics of care 
provides insight into what kinds of skills individuals need in order to do so. 
Regardless of this, it still cannot address the fairness of the distribution of care, and 
the unfairness of a woman who does all the caring for and is never taken care of. 
 
CONCLUSION 	
This chapter highlighted two significant aspects of nurturing work: firstly, that 
nurturing work is not the kind of thing that can be monetised because it is irreducible 
and impossible to outsource. Secondly, nurturing work is a moral activity, and I have 
argued that it is most usefully thought of as a virtue.  
Let us pause for a moment at the first aspect I have highlighted. Crucially, 
nurturing work does not have mere utility in completing tasks that need to be 
completed, but also does work on a relationship, and this means that only those party 
to the relationship can do this work, and that the quality of a relationship is in part 
determined by the nurturing work performed by those in the relationship. This 
answers a question that has come up throughout this thesis: does one’s partner have a 
monopoly on certain kinds of nurturing work one receives? The answer seems to be 
yes – even if one is taken care of by people outside of the relationship, the intimate 
relationship itself can only benefit from work done by oneself or by one’s partner. 
This coheres with the empirical data I presented in section 1.2.2, which stated that the 
level of satisfaction felt in a relationship is strongly correlated with the equality of 
emotion work performed, not the total emotion work performed. This also means that 
financial inequality between partners cannot justify an unequal division of emotional 
labour.  
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The second characteristic of nurturing work is its moral nature. I had hoped 
that this would yield a strong obligation to others to provide nurturing work. 
However, the formulations of ethics of care that I have looked at are rooted in context, 
and on existing responsibilities to care, which I have argued are too conservative to 
argue for a more egalitarian and less gendered distribution of nurturing work. In order 
to address this shortcoming, I used Raja Halwani’s argument that an ethic of care is 
best conceived of as a kind of virtue ethics, where care is a virtue. Viewing care as a 
virtue is primarily advantageous because it situates the (weak) obligation to care in 
the individual, so an individual who wants to become virtuous and flourish in a 
characteristically human way needs to become good at nurturing work.  
Despite this advantage, viewing care as a virtue still cannot impose obligations 
on individuals to others, and cannot explain why providing insufficient nurturing 
work for one’s partner is a way of wronging one’s partner. Instead, what this chapter 
has managed to argue is that, firstly, a relationship is enriched by the performance of 
nurturing work, and that individuals become more virtuous by doing nurturing work 
well. Therefore, I cannot conclude yet that an unequal division of nurturing work in a 
relationship is wrong as such. Nevertheless, the conclusion to this thesis will bring the 
question of gender in again, and solidify the arguments that a gendered division of 
nurturing work is wrongful because it violates a strong moral obligation. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Most women who are with men do not believe that their partners are sexist. In fact, I 
am explicitly interested in men who hold egalitarian ideologies, and as such, are 
indeed not sexist (by which I mean they do not hold inferiorising beliefs about 
women). As such, it can be easy to chalk up the unequal distribution of nurturing 
work in heterosexual relationships to factors other than gender inequality: for 
instance, to preference, to personality, or to innate ability. The couples I’ve 
encountered will often explain their unequal labour distribution in this way: ‘she’s 
just better at cooking than I am’, or ‘when I clean, I don’t do it to her standard, so it’s 
better if she just does it’, or, ‘eating dinner at a reasonable hour is more important to 
me than to him, so I just take responsibility for dinner’. They might also say, ‘my wife 
has an amazing ability to intuit what I’m feeling and provide empathy. I just don’t 
notice this kind of thing’. 
I hope that the work in the first chapter, and in fact in the subsequent chapters, 
has made clear that nurturing work is not a skill that women are better at because of 
their innate abilities. Rather, women are ‘better’ at it because they have been 
socialised into taking on this role, and because they are held accountable for 
performing it in a way that men are not. In other words, it is likelier to become part of 
their ‘personality’ because they need to be good at nurturing in order to be likeable, 
and as such are constantly motivated to do it in a way that men are not. One need only 
think of the study I cited in the first chapter that showed that men are equally good at 
empathy when they have financial motivation to do it.  
I turned to Jean Hampton’s solution because it is intended to counteract this 
tendency in the way women are socialised to be self-sacrificing. She proposes that 
one should deliberately invoke one’s self-interest to determine if one’s relationship is 
exploitative. She proposes that one set aside one’s feelings of love and duty which 
might cloud one’s judgement, and make a sober assessment of what one has sacrificed 
for one’s partner. Though I believe she has identified the problem very accurately, her 
solution is inadequate. I argued that the exclusion of feelings of love and duty in 
assessing one’s relationship would make one’s behaviour appear utterly irrational, 
since those are precisely the reasons why one makes sacrifices in a relationship, 
whether you are a man or a woman. I further argued in the fourth chapter that 
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nurturing work does not merely serve to complete a task or provide utility, but also 
does work on the relationship – in other words, these are tasks that are done in love 
and that foster love, and as such are excluded by the exclusion of feelings of love and 
duty.  
Okin’s argument is decidedly in the realm of political philosophy, and as such 
its excellence lies in identifying the duties of the state to address the injustice of the 
gendered structure of marriage. She shows how women are made materially 
vulnerable in anticipation of marriage, during marriage, and upon dissolution of 
marriage, and makes excellent suggestions of policies that would mitigate this 
vulnerability. She further suggests that workplaces need to be structured in such a 
way that makes it possible to have a more equal division of nurturing work but also of 
sacrifice between husband and wife. I endorse these policy recommendations entirely. 
The distribution of labour is unjust when it contributes to the material vulnerability of 
women, and it would be unjust of the workplace to prevent couples from achieving an 
egalitarian distribution of labour. However, this does not go far enough. I want to 
suggest that an unequal distribution of labour is wrong even if it does not render 
women materially vulnerable. To this end, I turned to theories of exploitation to show 
the wrongfulness of a gendered distribution of nurturing work.  
The work done by materialist feminists shows how women’s doing unpaid 
reproductive labour is integral to the functioning of capitalism. Though Marx saw 
exploitation as an ill of the proletariat, materialist feminism shows that women insofar 
as they are wives are also exploited, and that they constitute a class whose 
exploitation takes its own particular form, namely that a woman’s labour power is 
appropriated by her husband, with whom she bears a material relationship of serfdom. 
Therefore, capitalism is as bad for wives as it is for workers. However, this functions 
mostly as a critique of capitalism rather than a critique of the way people set up their 
relationships and households. It constitutes a structural critique of material relations, 
and not a critique of how men treat their partners, or indeed a statement on how 
labour ought to be distributed in the home. 
I thus turned to other definitions of exploitation that could show the wrong 
that the one who exploits does to the one exploited. The most productive definition is 
that of Ruth Sample, where she defines exploitation as a form of degradation, and an 
instance of such degradation is taking advantage of an existing injustice. This is 
certainly the case in a gendered distribution of nurturing work. That this distribution 
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of labour is a matter of justice was argued in the second chapter, but briefly, the 
virtually automatic allocation of labour based on a morally arbitrary factor such as 
gender, plus the fact that this has a great effect on women’s lives, makes it an issue of 
injustice. It is an injustice that women are socialised into being self-sacrificing and 
good at nurturing work, whereas men are not socialised into emotion work. Men 
benefit from doing less nurturing work than their partners: as a result of it, they live in 
more harmonious homes that are a pleasure to dwell in (without having contributed 
equally to making it so), they are healthier and more integrated socially, and they 
have their status elevated and their negative emotions soothed from receiving emotion 
work. Given that men benefit from the status quo, this constitutes gaining an 
advantage from an existing injustice. Thus, even if such a distribution caused no 
harm, and even though the relationship is mutually beneficial, is still constitutes 
exploitation because the advantage is gained through degradation. 
There is a further way in which an unequal distribution of nurturing work 
constitutes degradation, and that is because it is a case not just of unequal work, but 
unequal status accord. Emotion work in particular constitutes a kind of status accord, 
and by not reciprocating emotion work, a man performs for himself, for his partner, 
and those around him, that he is of higher status than his partner. By doing more 
emotion work than her partner, a woman affirms the same thing. This frequent 
affirmation of the greater importance assigned to men than women is a way of 
contributing to the lower status of women, and thereby degrades women. This gives a 
suggestion of the particular way in which a man wrongs his partner by not doing as 
much emotion work as she does – he degrades her by refusing to accord her status. 
This act is nevertheless not merely a wrong that occurs between two 
individuals. I argued that it contributes to a kind of structural injustice known as 
hermeneutical marginalisation. I used Bartky’s argument that emotion work involves 
an ‘epistemic lean’ that entails a woman ‘seeing the world according to him’, and this 
epistemic lean constitutes a displacement of a female perspective for a male one. If 
this is not reciprocated, then men continue to have an unfairly large role in generating 
cultural and social meanings. It is particularly significant in the generation of 
hermeneutical resources, which is precisely what is used to communicate ‘the world 
according to him’. For women’s perspectives to be allowed to help generate cultural 
meanings and hermeneutical resources, the ‘world according to her’ needs to be given 
as much status as the ‘world according to him’. The gendered unequal distribution of 
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nurturing work therefore contributes to the hermeneutical marginalisation of women, 
and as such, constitutes a kind of injustice.  
These three kinds of degradation happening over and over in the microcosm of 
the family normalises the oppression of women by diminishing their status, denying 
them the advantage in participating in the generation of hermeneutical resources, and 
takes advantage of the already diminished status of women. I believe this is sufficient 
to show that a gendered distribution of nurturing work is wrongful, and that it wrongs 
both individual women and women as a group.  
Given the obligations to avoid exploiting others and contributing to the 
degradation of others, there is a strong moral obligation on men to refrain from 
allowing their relationships to display a gendered distribution of labour. A gendered 
distribution of nurturing work thus constitutes a moral harm committed by men 
against their female partners. It is clear that these strong moral obligations derive 
from the fact that there are existing background conditions of gender injustice, and 
moreover, a gendered distribution of labour normalises and contributes to the 
oppression of women, which increases the moral urgency to oppose it. I have thus 
answered part of my question: at least when an unequal distribution of labour is 
gendered, it is wrong, and therefore there is a moral obligation to refrain from 
exploiting and degrading one’s partner in this way.  
However, this does not tell us whether or not an unequal distribution of labour 
is wrong as such. If the genders were reversed, and the male partner did more 
nurturing work than his partner, it would not be wrong for the reasons listed above, 
since they are premised on the one doing more work doing so because of existing 
oppression. I thus attempted to use ethics of care to try and establish a general moral 
obligation to reciprocate nurturing work.  
I was unable to do this. The ethics of care prefers the notion of ‘responsibility’ 
to ‘obligation’, which I argued makes it conservative rather than transformative, since 
‘responsibility’ is a descriptive claim about existing relationships and the psychology 
of the people involved in such relationships, rather than a normative claim. The ethics 
of care is thus extremely valuable in that it provides a nuanced account of what 
constitutes good care, but is unable to account for how caring relationships arise in the 
first place, and when they ought to arise if they have not already. I want to argue that 
an unequal division of nurturing work is wrong, and therefore the partner who does 
less ought to do more than (typically) he is presently doing. If the theory is 
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constrained by the existing dynamics of relationships, it cannot transform such 
dynamics. It cannot prescribe the obligation to become a better nurturer, and as such 
dooms whomever does more nurturing work to continue doing more nurturing work.  
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the ethics of care provides no insight. If 
we conceptualise care as a virtue, and subsume it into virtue ethics, then there is a 
weak moral obligation of some sort to become better carers. I call this moral 
obligation weak because it is not something owed to others, but rather in service of 
becoming a virtuous person who is capable of flourishing. I agreed with Halwani’s 
argument that care bears the required characteristics of virtue: it is an activity as well 
as a disposition, one can become excellent at it through practice, and it is undeniably 
linked to the achievement of eudaimonia. As such, people ought to be good carers in 
the same way they ought to be honest, just, temperate, and generous. Being good at 
nurturing work constitutes part of the ‘the good life’ that will facilitate one’s 
flourishing. The seriously diminished welfare of widowers after the death of their 
wives discussed in the first chapter proves the lack of flourishing that is the result of 
not engaging in nurturing work throughout one’s life.  
Because virtue ethics takes as its subject the actor rather than the acts, one 
important dimension of ethics of care is lost, and that is the notion of care as a 
relational activity. We saw that nurturing work cannot be reduced to mere utility 
partly because it does work to strengthen the relationship, not just achieving an end 
such as having clean dishes, a new book, or flowers in a vase. Nurturing work allows 
not only individuals to flourish, but also improves the quality of the relationship, and 
as such contributes to the flourishing of the relationship. We saw in the first chapter 
that it is empirically the case that people experience more relationship satisfaction the 
more emotion work both partners do (and in equal amounts), which corroborates the 
idea that nurturing work serves to strengthen the relationship. There is surely no 
moral obligation to have good romantic relationships, but it contributes to the 
flourishing of a relationship, and therefore to the flourishing of those in the 
relationship.  
Where a man in a relationship with a woman does less nurturing work than his 
partner, he must do more of it in order to allow the relationship to flourish. If this 
entails acquiring skills or knowledge to do this, he has an obligation to do this. If he 
does so, he also becomes more virtuous and likelier to flourish, and moreover, the 
quality of the relationship will improve and his partner is more likely to flourish too. 
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Doing more nurturing work is not limited to the relationship of the couple: doing 
more nurturing work for his friends, neighbours, or extended family, as well as 
children, will also contribute to his own flourishing, and to the flourishing of those 
relationships. Let us consider again one distressing statistic from the first chapter: in 
the case of a surviving parent, if that surviving parent is male, they have little more 
contact with their children than they would have if they were deceased. In other 
words, they are nearly completely isolated from their grown children. If men 
contribute more nurturing work to the relationships with their children throughout 
their lives, they are likely to have better relationships with their adult children, to the 
likely benefit of both parties.  
The ethics of care gives us insight into what becoming better at nurturing work 
would necessitate: one would have to learn to be attentive, and notice the needs of 
others. One would have to learn to take responsibility for the meeting of those needs. 
One would need to learn to be effective in the meeting of those needs, and learn to be 
responsive to the feedback of the care-receiver.  
The work done thus far dispels completely the notion that being a good 
nurturer is a personality trait, with all its connotations of being ‘hard-wired’ or 
unchangeable. It dispels the notion that some people (particularly women) do more 
nurturing work because they like to do it – rather, they are expected to do it in a way 
that men are not. This thesis has shown that men can be expected to do as much 
nurturing work (quantitatively) as well as women do it (qualitatively), and in fact not 
to do so constitutes exploitation and degradation of their partners, and neglect of the 
quality of their relationships with them. As such, I have proven a moral obligation to 
refrain from entertaining a gendered division of nurturing work in one’s relationship. I 
have further elevated the status of nurturing work to a component of human 
flourishing, as well as the flourishing of relationships. Therefore, though there may 
not be a moral obligation to have an equal distribution of nurturing work regardless of 
gender, there is certainly a way in which not having that is bad, in that it deviates 
from what constitutes ‘the good life’, and inhibits the flourishing of one’s most 
intimate and sustained relationships.  
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